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I. INTRODUCTION 
Several years before Todd Brecht improbably found himself before the 
Supreme Court, he was the protagonist in a human tragedy. Just out of a 
• Chief of Staff to the President, Harvard University. For helpful comments at earlier stages of this 
project, I would like to thank Tom Eaton, Cindy Estlund, Bob Iuliano, Christine Jolls, Dori Kaplan, 
Jonathan Sacks, Bill Stuntz, and Rebecca White. Thanks also to the editors and staff of the Northwest-
ern University Law Review for superb editing and other assistance. 
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Georgia prison, Brecht was staying with his sister, Molly Hartman, in the 
home she shared with her husband, the local district attorney, in a small 
town in western Wisconsin. Roger Hartman didn't approve of his brother-
in-law's drinking, sexual orientation, and criminal record. In retrospect, it 
was a recipe for disaster. 
When Todd Brecht was tried for the murder of his sister's husband, he 
took the stand and argued that his shooting of a rifle into Roger Hartman's 
back was an accident. In arguing that this version of events was incredible, 
the prosecutor told the jury several times that Brecht had never told anyone 
this explanation before his testimony at trial. But to the extent that this re-
ferred to Brecht's post-arrest silence, after receiving Miranda warnings, the 
prosecutor's comments to the jury violated due process. Brecht was con-
victed; on appeal, he claimed that this constitutional violation justified a 
new trial. 
When the Supreme Court ruled on his claim in 1993, eight years after 
the shooting, it was the fifth court to answer the question whether the con-
stitutional violation had sufficiently impacted the trial to require reversal of 
the murder conviction, or whether the error was "harmless." Each court had 
reversed the one before it. 1 The Supreme Court upheld Brecht's conviction, 
in an opinion agreeing with the analysis of Seventh Circuit Judge Frank 
Easterbrook below.2 But the questions surrounding "the riddle of harmless 
error"3 continued, beyond the case of Todd Brecht and a prosecutor whose 
constitutional missteps were forgiven at a trial in which he was no doubt 
singularly focused on punishing his boss's killer. 
* * * 
The harmless-error rule has been called "probably the most cited rule 
in modem criminal appeals."4 The Chief Judge of the Second Circuit has 
referred to harmless error as "one of the most important doctrines in appel-
late decisionmaking," and posited that harmless-error principles may de-
termine the outcome of more criminal appeals than any other doctrine.5 A 
1 State v. Brecht, 405 N.W.2d 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (reversing conviction), rev'd, 421 N.W.2d 
96 (Wis. 1988); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 759 F. Supp. 500 (W.D. Wis.) (granting writ), rev'd, 944 F.2d 
1363 (7th Cir. 1991). 
2 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993). 
3 This phrase is taken from the title of ROGER J. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR 
(1970). 
4 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. ~61, 161 (2001). 
5 Hon.John M. Walker, Jr., Harmless Error Review in the Second Circuit, 63 BROOK. L. REv. 395, 
395 (1997). Chief Judge Walker also quoted one of his predecessors, former Chief Juuge Jon Newman, 
for the related point that "assessment of harmlessness is probably the single most recurring issue pre-
sented" in habeas corpus challenges to state court convictions. /d. at n.2 (quoting Peck v. United States, 
102 F.3d 1319, 1327 (2d Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Newman, J., concurring)). Indeed, two of the most 
prominent judges in the history of the Second Circuit and of twentieth century American law, Learned 
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leading treatise on federal appellate practice calls harmless error "probably 
the most far-reaching doctrinal change in American procedural jurispru-
dence since its inception."6 
In 1970, in what remains the seminal work on harmless error, Roger 
Traynor-then Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court-pointed to 
the "obvious need of guidelines to control appellate discretion in the evalua-
tion of error."7 But in the wake of the decision in Todd Brecht's case, 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, harmless-error doctrine remains a bit of a mess. 
Thirty-five years after Justice Traynor identified the problem, the signifi-
cance of the doctrine has grown, while the need for further guidelines re-
mains strong. 
It is difficult to overstate the stakes. The criminal justice system has 
been shaken by increasing evidence of wrongful convictions, and most of 
the constitutional errors being assessed in harmless-error analysis are cen-
tral to the truth-determining process of criminal trials. Getting harmless-
error determinations right, then, is central to accurate determinations of 
guilt-an area about which there is evident cause for concern. 
The conventional wisdom on harmless-error doctrine is that there are 
two different and irreconcilable approaches that judges use in determining 
harmless error which are reflected in two coexisting lines of Supreme Court 
cases. Much of the scholarship on harmless error, as well as the ongoing 
debate within the Supreme Court, focuses on the difference in these two ap-
proaches. But this debate overstates the difference between the two ap-
proaches and obscures the shared normative ideal at the heart of harmless-
error doctrine. Contrary to conventional assumptions underlying debates on 
harmless error, I argue that by using tort law, these two approaches can be 
reconciled in a way that increases the overall accuracy of harmless-error 
analysis. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II is a brief overview of harm-
less-error doctrine in the context of habeas challenges to state criminal con-
victions, focusing on the nature of the inquiry and the doctrinal deadlock 
described above. Part III is an empirical analysis of the post-Brecht cases in 
the federal courts of appeals. To search for a way out ofthe doctrinal dead-
lock, I started with a relatively straightforward question: what has hap-
pened to harmless-error analysis since Brecht? To answer this question, I 
reviewed and, with the help of a research assistant, coded all of the 315 
harmless-error analyses on habeas review in published opinions over the 
last decade. Despite the different approaches, a common thread emerges: 
Hand and Jerome Frank, sparred over the issue of harmless error in a series of cases in the 1940s. See 
Charles S. Chapel, The Irony of Harmless Error, 51 OKLA. L. REv. 501,522-23 & nn.l23-24 (1998) 
(citing and summarizing these cases). 
6 2 STEVEN A. CHILDRESS & MARTHA S. DAVIS, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW§ 7.03, at 7 (2d 
ed.J986). 
7 TRAYNOR, supra note 3, at 15. 
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the language and logic of causation is everywhere, as courts struggle to as-
sess the causal impact of an error on the jury's verdict. Contrary to the 
conventional view, judges using different approaches to harmless-error are 
actually trying to answer the same fundamental question: did the error 
cause the conviction? 
Part IV proposes reconceptualizing harmless-error analysis as a deter-
mination of causation in a constitutional tort claim and using this reconcep-
tion to provide a way out of the doctrinal morass. By turning to tort-law 
debates about what it means to cause harm, I grapple with the question: 
what does it mean for an error to cause a conviction? Indeed, it appears that 
different conceptions of causation-described in tort law as the "but for" 
versus the "substantial factor" tests-account for many of the differences in 
harmless-error outcomes in the federal courts. I argue that a hybrid ap-
proach can better serve the normative ideal of determining factual causation 
at criminal trials while avoiding appellate fact-finding that violates the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee of a trial by jury. 
In Part V, I tum to prescription: how should judges implement this 
proposed reconception of harmless error? First, I observe the difference be-
tween the harmless-error cases and the social science literature with respect 
to the dominant model of how jurors use evidence to reach a verdict. I ar-
gue that in the absence of direct evidence about the impact of errors on par-
ticular jurors, drawing inferences from empirical research on juries as part 
of the harmless-error analysis is both appropriate and desirable. And in fo-
cusing on the issue of causation, judges and lawyers should turn their atten-
tion to evidence of influence on the jury, as opposed to simply weighing the 
evidence of guilt. 
II. THE STILL UNSOLVED RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR: DOCTRINAL 
DEADLOCK, UNGUIDED DISCRETION 
"The expansive code of constitutional criminal procedure that the Su-
preme Court has created in the name of the Constitution is like the 
grapes of Tantalus, since the equally expansive harmless error rule in 
most cases prevents a criminal defendant from obtaining any benefit 
from the code."8 
- Judge Richard Posner 
A. Harmless Error on Habeas: Where the Rubber Hits the Road in 
Constitutional Criminal Procedure 
The Bill of Rights reflects a number of values, including that of fur-
thering the truth-in this context, convicting the guilty and acquitting the 
innocent. But our society's confidence in the criminal justice system and its 
8 United States v. Pallais, 921 F.2d 684,692 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.). 
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truth-furthering safeguards has been shaken in the decade since Brecht was 
decided. DNA and other forms of forensic evidence have led to the over-
turning of scores of convictions in recent years, a rethinking of the death 
penalty in many states, and a renewed focus on police interrogations, eye-
witness identification, and other staples of criminal prosecution.9 The ex-
oneration of innocent people who have served years in prison continues, 
and while many have been released, others no doubt remain imprisoned 
while the actual perpetrators go free. 10 The overwhelming majority of the 
exonerees were wrongfully convicted at state criminal trials. 
For institutional and historical reasons, many have long questioned 
state courts' commitment to the protection of federal procedural safeguards 
in criminal cases. 11 As a result, Congress passed, just after the Civil War, 
the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to provide a federal forum for state prison-
ers, and more recently, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a general 
post-conviction remedy for state convictions tainted by constitutional viola-
tions.12 These constitutional violations are important, for the Rehnquist 
Court at least, because they indicate that the truth-furthering function of 
constitutional criminal procedure has been hampered, increasing the risk of 
inaccurate determinations of guilt. 13 
In many ways, federal habeas petitions are a crapshoot. 14 The over-
whelming majority of petitions are filed without counsel, but studies have 
demonstrated that "the availability of professional representation is the sin-
gle most important predictor of success in federal habeas corpus."15 Be-
9 For a summary of some of these developments, see Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Prob-
lem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REv. 891 (2004); Daniel Givelber, Mean-
ingless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REv. 
1317 (1997); Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capi-
tal Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 469 (1996). 
10 For an ongoing account of exonerations around the country, see 
http://www .innocenceproject.org. 11 This suspicion, of course, is what led to the passage of the law extending the scope of federal ha-
beas corpus to state prisoners in the aftermath of the Civil War. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 415-18 
(1963); Daniel 1. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 28 (1994) 
("The existence of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction itself reflects doubts that state courts, left to their 
own devices, would adequately enforce federal constitutional norms."); Larry W. Yackle, Explaining 
Habeas Corpus, 60N.Y.U. L. REV. 991, 1031-32 (1985). 12 See Yackle, supra note 11, at 1031. 
13 See Tom Stacy, The Search for the Truth in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 91 COLUM. L. 
REv. 1369, 1372 (1991). 14 Of the federal habeas petitions filed, it is estimated that between seventy and eighty percent are 
state prisoners who were convicted after trial. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction: The 
Limits of Models, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 2507,2524 & n.105 (1993). During 2000, 17 out of every 1000 
state inmates filed habeas corpus petitions. John Scalia, Prisoner Petitions Filed in U.S. District Courts, 
2000, with Trends /980-2000, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, at 2, available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppfusdOO.pdf (last modified Feb. 5, 2002). 15 Richard Faust et al., The Great Writ in Action: Empirical Light on the Federal Habeas Corpus 
Debate, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 637, 707 (1991). Undoubtedly, the potential strength of the 
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cause of the stakes involved for the defendant (usually a long prison sen-
tence or the death penalty) and the length of time it takes to get habeas peti-
tions adjudicated, most habeas cases involve people convicted after being 
tried for murder. 16 Although less than 5% of state felony cases are resolved 
by trial each year,17 one out of three defendants facing murder charges go to 
trial, compared to no more than I 0% of defendants charged with other of-
fenses.18 
In a subset of these cases, a federal district or appellate judge deter-
mines that constitutional error occurred during the process that led to the 
petitioner's incarceration. In such cases, the truth-furthering safeguards 
were impaired, providing an indicator that the petitioner may have been in-
nocent. The question then becomes whether the court should remedy error 
by overturning the conviction. Here the "harmless error" doctrine kicks in, 
and the rubber hits the road for constitutional criminal procedure and the 
accurate determination of guilt. 
In this Article, I focus on these important cases in which a judge finds 
that constitutional error has infected the trial and must determine whether 
the error is harmless. In conducting harmless-error analysis, the Supreme 
Court has emphasized that "the central purpose of a criminal trial is to de-
cide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence .... " 19 This 
focus on the truth-determining function of the criminal trial animates the 
Court's harmless error jurisprudence.20 Despite other possible reasons for 
remedying constitutional violations at criminal trials, judges will only rem-
edy the constitutional violation if they believe it has impacted the jury's de-
termination of guilt or innocence. The success of harmless-error analysis, 
claims is related to the defendant's ability to get appointed counsel by the court, or to otherwise get a 
lawyer to take his case, but it is doubtful that the relationship is particularly robust. 16 See Roger A. Hanson & Henry W.K. Daley, Federal Habeas Corpus Review, Challenging State 
Court Criminal Convictions, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, at v (Sept. 1995), avail-
able at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fhcrcscc.pdf (reviewing nearly half of the federal habeas 
petitions adjudicated in 1992 and finding that most involved challenges for prisoners "primarily con-
victed of violent offenses and given correspondingly severe sentences"); see also id. at 12 (noting that 
most offenders convicted of felonies are sentenced to five years or less, but the time required to exhaust 
state remedies takes on average almost five years). 17 Approximately one in three cases ended with a dismissal, and 65% of felony cases were resolved 
by guilty pleas. See Brian Ostrom eta!., Examining the Work of State Courts, Nat'] Ctr. for State Courts 
44 (2003), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2003_Files/2003_Main_Page.html. 18 Gerard Rainville & Brian A. Reaves, Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties, 2000, U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, at 26 (Dec. 2003), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fdlucOO.pdf. In 2000, an estimated 4% of the cases adjudicated 
within one year went to trial. Fifty-seven percent of these trials were bench trials, and 43% were jury 
trials. An estimated 78% of all trials ended with a guilty verdict, and 22% with an acquittal. Bench tri-
als (81%) were more likely to result in a conviction than jury trials (74%). /d. 19 Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Ardsall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 
(1986)). 
20 Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 79, 
80-81 (1988) (criticizing this emphasis). 
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then, is a critical part of maintaining a reasonably accurate criminal justice 
system. 
In harmless-error analysis, judges are asked to determine the impact 
that the error-whether it be improperly admitted evidence, improperly ex-
cluded evidence, or faulty jury instructions-had on the jury's verdict. As 
Justice Traynor put it, review for harmless error "requires the most pains-
taking examination of the record and the most perceptive reflections as to 
the probabilities of the effect of error on a reasonable trier of fact." 21 
B. The Doctrinal Backdrop-and Current Deadlock-on Harmless Error 
Doctrinally, the nature and source of harmless-error analysis is less 
than clear. The statute authorizing federal habeas jurisdiction over state 
court prisoners22 says nothing about harmless error, although the Supreme 
Court has turned in part to the statute governing harmless error in federal 
criminal appeals, and the case law surrounding it, to interpret harmless error 
in the habeas context_23 Absent a specific statutory source, however, some 
scholars have referred to the doctrine as "constitutional common law."24 
But, since harmless error does not address whether a constitutional violation 
actually occurred, other scholars consider harmless error a part of the law of 
remedies.25 We are left wondering whether harmless error is part of the law 
of constitutional criminal procedure, remedies, both or neither. This mat-
ters because interpretive questions arise constantly, with the need to turn to 
some purpose or background doctrine. 
From 1867 to 1967, courts applied the harmless-error doctrine in 
criminal cases only to nonconstitutional errors. Constitutional errors were 
per se reversible, without evaluating the impact of the error on the jury's 
verdict. This changed with the Supreme Court's 1967 decision in Chapman 
v. California.26 In Chapman, the Court declared that constitutional errors 
21 TRAYNOR, supra note 3, at 30; see also Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 653 (9th Cir. 2002) (ob-
serving that judges conducting harmless-error analysis "are asked to make a judgment about the likely 
reasoning patterns" of jurors). 
22 28 u.s.c. § 2254 (2000). 
23 See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995). 
24 Craig Goldblatt, Harmless Error as Constitutional Common Law: Congress's Power to Reverse 
Arizona v. Fulrninante, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 985, 1009-12 (1993); Henry P. Monaghan, Harmless Error 
and the Valid Rule Requirement, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 195,200 & n.30. 
25 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional 
Remedies, I 04 HARV. L. REv. 1733, 1770-73 (1991) (arguing that harmless-error doctrine emerges from 
a "balancing calculus familiar to the law of remedies: if the risks of prejudice, though not nonexistent, 
are small, the burdens of retrial are not warranted"). 
26 386 U.S. 18 (1967); see also Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Searching for Harmlessness: Method and Mad-
ness in the Supreme Court's Harmless Constitutional Error Doctrine, 50 U. KAN. L. REv. 309, 313 
(2002) (describing the development of harmless error in the twentieth century as "steady expansion"). 
For a comprehensive look at the history and development of harmless-error doctrine, see id. at 314-24; 
Chapel, supra note 5, at 515-30; Martha S. Davis, Harmless Error in Federal Criminal and Habeas Ju-
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would not necessitate overturning a conviction if the error was "harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt.'m After Chapman, the use of the harmless-
error doctrine increased significantly, doubling within three years in the 
federal courts of appeals.28 According to one estimate, in the decade fol-
lowing Chapman approximately 1 0% of all criminal appellate cases 
throughout the country were determined by a finding of harmless constitu-
tional error.29 But as applied to constitutional error in criminal trials, the 
harmless-error doctrine has frequently been criticized.30 
If the 1967 Chapman decision opened the door slightly to maintaining 
convictions tainted by constitutional error, the 1993 Brecht decision opened 
the door even wider. Previously, the state had been required to demonstrate 
that the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" to avoid a new 
trial or sentencing proceeding, but Brecht held that the state was only re-
quired to show that the error did not have a "substantial and injurious effect 
or influence in determining the jury's verdict."31 In this way, the Court 
broadened the range of constitutional errors that would not be remedied on 
collateral review to beyond the merely trivial. 
The five-to-four decision was controversial. Justice Stevens's concur-
rence provided the crucial fifth vote, and it emphasized his belief that the 
change in standard was "less significant than it might seem.''32 Justice 
O'Connor's dissent disagreed, arguing that "by tolerating a greater prob-
ability that an error with the potential to undermine verdict accuracy was 
harmful, the Court increases the likelihood that a conviction will be pre-
risprudence: The Beast That Swallowed the Constitution, 25 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 45, 46--50, 57-77 
(2000). 
27 386 U.S. at 24. 
28 See Donald A. Winslow, Note, Harmful Use of Harmless Error in Criminal Cases, 64 CORNELL 
L. REv. 538, 545-46 & n.36 (1979). The proportion of harmless error cases remained at approximately 
2% until 1986, when the percentage dropped to 1.58% and held there through the mid-l990s. See Harry 
T. Edwards, To Err Is Human, but Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1167, 1180-81 & n.52 (1995). 
29 See Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1980). 
30 See, e.g., David R. Dow & James Rytting, Can Constitutional Error Be Harmless?, 2000 UTAH 
L. REv. 483; Bennett L. Gershman, The Gate Is Open but the Door Is Locked-Habeas Corpus and 
Harmless Error, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 115, 132 (1994) (criticizing the harmless error rule's "stan-
dardless and ad hoc application by appellate judges who purport to be making precise quantitative and 
qualitative calculations of the impact of errors based on the 'cold black and white of the printed record"' 
(quoting United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062, 1067 (2d Cir. 1970))); Rex R. Perschbacher & 
Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REv. l, 39 (2004) (arguing that the harmless error doc-
trine is now applied to mistakes "for which the adjective 'harmless' seems highly questionable"). 
For the purposes of this Article, I accept the harmless-error doctrine as necessary and, more impor-
tantly, entrenched. Moreover, I accept harmless-error doctrine's premise that judicial remedies for con-
stitutional violations at criminal trials should be limited to cases where the judge is uncertain that the 
determination of legal guilt was accurate. 
31 507 u.s. 619, 638 (1993). 
32 /d. at 643 (Stevens, J ., concurring). 
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served despite an error that actually affected the reliability of the trial.'033 
The weight of scholarly reaction was critical, with one commentator con-
cluding that Brecht "effectively locks the door to meaningful habeas review 
of most constitutional trial violations" and "strikes a heavy blow to effec-
tive federal oversight of state constitutional violations.m4 
After Brecht, what is the precise question that the judge must answer? 
In Brecht, the question was whether the error had a "substantial and injuri-
ous effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict."35 This formula-
tion relied in turn on Kotteakos, where Justice Rutledge said: 
[I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened 
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was 
not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substan-
tial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether it was 
enough to support the result, apart from the evidence affected by the error. It 
is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if 
one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.36 
But since Brecht, different verbal formulations have continued to pro-
liferate in the Court. In Sullivan v. Louisiana, Justice Scalia explained that 
harmless-error review "looks ... to the basis on which 'the jury actually 
rested its verdict. "'37 He explained further: "The inquiry ... is not whether, 
in a trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have 
been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial 
was surely unattributable to the error.''38 In 0' Neal, Justice Breyer said that 
the judge should ask: "Do I, the judge, think that the error substantially in-
fluenced the jury's decision?"39 But in Neder v. United States, Justice 
Rehnquist put the nature of the inquiry somewhat differently: "Is it clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defen-
dant guilty absent the error?"40 
33 !d. at 653 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
34 See Gershman, supra note 30, at 132-33. Gershman pointed to the state and federal judges' dif-
ferent assessments of harm in Brecht as "a striking example of the essential absurdity of harmless error 
review." !d. at 132. Along similar lines, Liebman and Hertz observed that "it is difficult to avoid Jus-
tice O'Connor's suspicion that the Court's goal is not improvement in the administration of justice but, 
instead, 'denying [habeas corpus] relief whenever possible."' James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Brecht 
v. Abrahamson: Harmful E"or in Habeas Corpus Law, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1156 
(1994) (quoting Brecht, 507 U.S. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting)). 
35 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 
36 !d. at 764-{;5. 
37 508 U.S. 275,279 (1993) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 321,404 (1991)). 
38 !d. 
39 513 u.s. 432, 436 (1995). 
40 527 U.S. I, 18 (1999). Though this case was a direct appeal from a federal criminal conviction, 
the difference in how the inquiry is framed remains instructive and applicable to the habeas context. 
Scalia retorted in a footnote in his dissent that "[t]he jury has the right to apply its own logic (or illogic) 
to its decision to convict or acquit." !d. at 35 n.2. 
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There are subtle but real differences among these formulations. In-
deed, scholars tend to agree that there are two very different approaches that 
judges use in determining harmless error.41 Under the error-based approach, 
the focus of the court is on the likely impact of the error on the jury in the 
actual trial that took place. Under the guilt-based approach, the court con-
siders a hypothetical trial conducted without the constitutional error, and 
asks whether the defendant would have nonetheless been convicted. The 
Supreme Court has used both approaches while rarely discussing the dis-
tinctions between them.42 
Scholars have weighed in, mostly on the side of the error-based ap-
proach, 43 and almost all with the view that the two approaches are irrecon-
cilable.44 At this point, scholars even disagree about the current state of the 
law. After Brecht, Liebman and Hertz thought that the issue was decided in 
favor of the error-based approach, a reaction that other scholars shared after 
the Supreme Court's 1993 decision in Sullivan v. Louisiana.45 Later cases, 
41 See Cooper, supra note 26, at 325 (noting that since Chapman, the two approaches "have battled 
for supremacy"). 
42 As one scholar put it, "[i]n its harmless error jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has endorsed both 
general approaches to measuring harm." Gregory Mitchell, Against "Overwhelming" Appellate Activ-
ism: Constraining Harmless Error Review, 82 CAL. L. REv. 1335, 1341 (1994). Mitchell also observed 
that the "relatively short history of the harmless error test has been one of considerable confusion." !d. 
at 1342. 
For examples of the Supreme Court using a "guilt-based" approach, see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 
U.S. 279, 310 (1991), United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510-11 (1983), Brown v. United States, 
411 U.S. 223 (1973), Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972), Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 
(1972), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969). For examples of the Supreme Court using 
an "error-based" approach, see O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432 (1995), Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 
U.S. 619 (1993), Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296-300; id. at 313 (Kennedy, J., concurring), Satterwhite v. 
Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 259 (1988), and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 
43 See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 28, at 1192-94; Martha A. Field, Assessing the Harmlessness of 
Federal Constitutional Error-A Process in Need of a Rationale, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 32-36 (1976); 
Mitchell, supra note 42, at 1365-68. 44 See, e.g., John H. Blume & Stephen P. Garvey, Harmless Error in Federal Habeas Corpus After 
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 163, 176 (1993) (describing the two approaches as 
"analytically distinct"). But see Cooper, supra note 26, at 332 (describing the "conceptual overlap" be-
tween the two approaches); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Harm of Harmless Error, 59 VA. L. REv. 988, 
1008 & n.64 (I 973) (arguing that the two tests are "substantially alike"). In the scholarship and com-
mentary, the "guilt-based" approach is also referred to as the "overwhelming evidence" test, see, e.g., 
Cooper, supra note 26; Field, supra note 43, and the "hypothetical trial" approach, see Liebman & 
Hertz, supra note 34. The "error-based" approach is also referred to as the "effect-on-the-verdict" ap-
proach, see, e.g., Edwards, supra note 28, and the "actual trial" approach, see Liebman & Hertz, supra 
note 34. For more extensive discussions of the difference between the two approaches, see Blume & 
Garvey, supra note 44, at 176-82, Edwards, supra note 28, at 1185-1209 (discussing the two ap-
proaches, and preferring the "effect-on-the-verdict approach" over the "guilt-based approach"), Field, 
supra note 43, at 16-36 (referring to these two approaches as "opposite extremes," but also considering 
a third approach), and Mitchell, supra note 42, 1341-47 (comparing the two approaches, and also con-
sidering hybrid approaches). 
45 508 U.S. 275 (1993); see also Mitchell, supra note 42, at 1339 (concluding that after Sullivan, the 
guilt-based approach "should be considered an impermissible test"). 
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particularly those applying harmless error in the federal criminal context, 
have led some commentators to conclude that Sullivan was a mere blip, and 
that Chief Justice Rehnquist's guilt-based approach had emerged victori-
ous.46 Others view the two approaches as uneasily coexisting, with one 
scholar going so far as to say that judges have a choice in which approach 
to use.47 One wonders if Justice Rehnquist, who frequently uses the guilt-
based approach, and Justice Scalia, who is fiercely partial to the error-based 
view, would give the same answer if asked about the current state of the 
law. 
In part the different approaches simply reflect differing levels of com-
fort with a certain amount of appellate fact-finding, which harmless error 
necessarily entails. Justice Rehnquist shrugs his shoulders, it seems: as he 
stated in Neder, the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence inevita-
bly affects "the jury's deliberative process in ways that are, strictly speak-
ing, not readily calculable."48 Scalia, though, cannot tolerate such invasion 
into the province of the jury; if judicial fact-finding is needed to uphold the 
verdict, then the conviction simply cannot stand. As he reminded his col-
leagues with outraged use of italics in his Neder dissent, "the Constitution 
does not trust judges to make determinations of criminal guilt. "49 
Fundamentally, the harmless-error inquiry is an empirical, if unan-
swerable, one: what impact did the error have on the actual jury's verdict? 
That is, the jurors sit through the trial, listen to the opening statements, and 
receive various pieces of evidence, all the while making a judgment about 
whether they think the defendant is guilty or innocent. The constitutional 
error has a tangible impact on the mind of the jurors. For example, after 
hearing an improperly admitted co-defendant's confession, four jurors may 
be significantly more likely to convict the defendant, four other jurors may 
be absolutely convinced that the defendant is guilty, and the remaining four 
jurors may give the confession little to no weight. Actual impact on the 
verdict is the focus of the harmless-error analysis.50 
46 See Cooper, supra note 26, at 324 (concluding, after reviewing Supreme Court doctrine, that "a 
clear, if narrow, majority of the Court supports the overwhelming evidence standard" while acknowl-
edging that "the question cannot be regarded as settled"). 47 Dan Simon, A Third View of the Black Box: Cognitive Coherence in Legal Decision Making, 71 
U. CHI. L. REv. 511,575 (2004) (describing harmless-error analysis as an area where legal decisionmak-
ers "have a choice as to the nature of their task" because of the two approaches). 48 Nederv. United States, 527 U.S. I, 18 (1999). 
49 !d. at 32 (Scalia, J ., dissenting). 
50 See Mitchell, supra note 42, at 1357 ("An appellate court deciding a harmless error case must 
make a determination that is largely factual in nature."); Stacy & Dayton, supra note 20, at 128-29 
n.l95 (noting that "[l]anguage in several Supreme Court decisions suggests that harmless error analysis 
entails an empirical evaluation of the likely influence the error had on the jury's decision to convict" 
(citing cases)). But see Davis, supra note 26, at 89-90 ("When the issue arises, it seems likely that the 
Supreme Court will determine that, despite its fact-like characteristics, harmless error is at least a mixed 
question and perhaps pure law."). 
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This cognitive task is quite different than most undertaken by judges. 
Judges perform a variety of cognitive tasks in deciding a case: they inter-
pret statutes, determine the state of legal doctrine, and apply legal doctrine 
to a particular set of facts. They also make retrospective evaluations of the 
reasonableness of people's behavior, but generally limit that analysis to the 
parties in a case. 51 Certainly, in bench trials where judges are the fmders of 
fact, they frequently must determine state of mind, such as the intent of a 
criminal defendant. But federal district and appellate judges are rarely 
asked to determine the state of mind of jurors in a state criminal trial. The 
task of the judge in harmless-error determinations is to read the minds of 
twelve jurors-people the habeas judge has never met, and about whom he 
has virtually no information.52 
So regardless of the precise question, how are judges to determine the 
answer? This question of the content of the harmless-error analysis--once 
you get past the "guilt-based" or "error-based" question-is touched upon 
in Delaware v. Van Ardsall, where the Court specified the factors a court 
should consider in evaluating the harm of a Confrontation Clause viola-
tion.53 With respect to other types of constitutional violations, though, judi-
cial discretion in determining harmlessness is largely unguided. In Part III, 
I take a closer empirical look at how federal appellate judges have actually 
been making this determination. 
III. HOW ARE JUDGES DETERMINING HARMLESSNESS?: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS OF THE POST -BRECHT CASES 
Part III is an empirical analysis of the post-Brecht cases in the federal 
courts of appeals, attempting to answer the question: what has happened to 
harmless-error analysis since Brecht?54 Or put differently, how have courts 
51 For example, when determining negligence in a tort case, a judge determines what a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position would do and then compares the defendant's behavior to that of the 
reasonable person. 52 As the Kotteakos Court put it, "[t]he crucial thing is the impact of the thing done wrong on the 
minds of other men, not on one's own, in the total setting." Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 
767 (1946). For skeptical views on this task, see Cooper, supra note 26, at 312, indicating that the de-
termination of harmlessness "necessarily rests on fiction" and involves a task that appellate judges are 
"fundamentally unqualified to perform," and Sam Kamin, Harmless Error and the Rights/Remedies 
Split, 88 VA. L. REv. I, 21 (2002), arguing that the impossibility of the cognitive task of harmless error 
means that "there is simply no way that consensus can be found regarding the results of hard cases" and 
that the conclusions obtained from harmless-error analysis "can be no better than science fiction." 53 475 u.s. 673,681-82 (1986). 
54 In asking this question, I do not attempt to answer the question that divided commentators in the 
immediate aftermath of Brecht: whether the standard would be significantly different than the Chapman 
standard. Rather, I take the view offered in Justice O'Connor's Brecht dissent that both standards "re-
quire[] an exercise of judicial judgment that cannot be captured by the naked words of verbal formulae," 
echoed in Justice Stevens's concurrence that "[i]n the end, the way we phrase the governing standard is 
far less important than the quality of the judgment with which it is applied." 507 U.S. 619,656 (1993) 
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 643 (Stevens, J., concurring). I therefore look at how that "judicial 
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been determining which constitutional errors should be remedied? These 
post-Brecht cases conduct the harmless-error analysis in the context of fed-
eral habeas review of state court convictions infected by constitutional vio-
lations. 
A. Methodology 
The data come from a sample of 263 published habeas opinions from 
the federal courts of appeals, decided from May 1993 through July 2004, in 
which the majority opinion directly addressed the issue of whether an al-
leged error was harmless or harmful. Each error discussed in a given case 
generated a separate analysis, resulting in 315 analyses overall. Of these, 
287 are Brecht harmless-error analyses, with the remainder consisting of 
analyses of "prejudice" for claims where the existence of a constitutional 
violation itself depends on the effect on the verdict.55 Several variables 
were coded for each analysis including the type of error, the approach used 
by the court to arrive at its decision, and the reason for determining that the 
error was harmless or harmful.56 Methodologically, this analysis takes the 
judgment" is being exercised in cases applying Brecht, under a standard that we know "will permit more 
errors to pass uncorrected." !d. at 656 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
55 These include ineffective assistance of counsel claims and claims that the prosecution failed to 
disclose exculpatory evidence. See Edwards, supra note 28, at 1178 (summarizing the kinds of constitu-
tional claims that incorporate the harmlessness inquiry into the determination of whether an error has 
even occurred). I have included these analyses as well because the inquiry is essentially the same as that 
undertaken in a Brecht harmless-error analysis. 
56 Each separate analysis was coded for several variables. There were four summary case statistics 
including: date the case was decided, crime, length of sentence the petitioner received, and time since 
the trial. In addition, the decision type was coded as being en bane, unanimous, concurrence or dissent. 
The analyses were coded for whether the defendant testified, and whether the defendant had a lawyer or 
was pro se. The error was coded for the time in which it took place: pretrial, trial or sentencing, and if 
during the trial, whether it was early, late, or in the middle of the trial. The type of error was also coded 
as being included evidence, excluded evidence or other, and for which constitutional right it violated 
(Fifth Amendment Miranda violation, Sixth Amendment confrontation error, Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel error, Fourteenth Amendment jury instruction error, Fourteenth Amendment prosecution error, 
Fourteenth Amendment right to present a defense error, or other type of error). 
The harmless error analysis was coded according to the standard used, whether the court placed the 
burden on the petitioner or the state, whether the court used a test for determining harm, whether the 
court used a guilt-based or verdict-based approach, whether the jury asked questions about the evidence, 
whether the jury instructions were mentioned, whether the length of the deliberations were mentioned, 
whether the court decided based on the weight of the evidence or the plausibility of competing narra-
tives, whether the summation/opening was mentioned, and whether the defense theory of the case was 
mentioned. The reasons for finding an error harmless were coded using the following categories: the 
quantity of the evidence against the petitioner, the quality of the evidence against the petitioner, the 
presence of an ameliorating instruction, the evidence was merely cumulative, the error was irrelevant, or 
the evidence was insignificant. The reasons for finding the error harmful or for remanding on harm 
were that the other evidence was weak, the errors were cumulatively significant, the improper evidence 
was significant, or the error was itself significant. 
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judicial reasoning presented in written opinions seriously as an indicator, at 
least, of the actual reasoning used to reach decision.57 
This empirical inquiry into lower court application of harmless-error 
analysis since Brecht has several components. For example, after Brecht, 
there was confusion in the lower courts about whether the petitioner or the 
state bore the burden of demonstrating harm. This confusion was clarified 
in a 1995 case called 0' Neal v. McAninch, which held that when the judge 
was in "grave doubt" on the harmlessness of the error, the petitioner should 
be granted relief.58 Are courts following O'Neal? Are there certain kinds of 
errors that are more likely to be held harmful than others? What factors are 
courts using, regardless of the approach, to actually determine whether an 
error is harmful? Are courts using predominantly the guilt-based or the er-
ror-based approach? Finally, does there appear to be any common ground 
between these two approaches, or are we stuck in doctrinal deadlock? 
B. Summary of Findings 
Most of the errors (72%) took place during trial. 59 Of the sentencing 
errors, nearly all (seventy-five out of seventy-seven) were in capital cases. 
In 80% of the analyses, the crime was murder,60 and 54% were murder trial 
analyses. Improperly included evidence comprised 52% of the errors, im-
properly excluded evidence 18% and other error types, such as improper 
jury instructions, the remainder. 61 As Table 1 shows, the most common vio-
lations were errors in instructing the jury and Confrontation Clause viola-
tions, each with roughly one-fifth of the errors. The rest of the errors 
included Miranda violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial 
misconduct, and impairment of the right to present a defense. 62 
57 My sample, and method of analysis, falls somewhere between an in-depth, doctrinal analysis of a 
handful of Supreme Court cases and a large-scale, empirical analysis that involves running multivariate 
regressions on a large database of cases. The number of harmless-error analyses is large enough to per-
mit some generalization, but small enough to actually be able to read all the cases and have a textured 
sense of what is going on. 
58 513 U.S. 432 (1995). Baseball fans know this as the "tie goes to the runner" rule. 
59 In 227 of the 315 analyses the error took place during the trial. Of the remaining errors, nineteen 
( 6%) were pretrial and seventy-seven (24%) were sentencing errors. 
60 Of the 315 analyses, 253 were for trials where the petitioner was accused of murder. 
61 One hundred sixty-four of the analyses were improperly included evidence errors, while fifty-
seven were improperly excluded evidence and ninety-four (30%) were other types of errors. 
62 Forty-three (14%) of the analyses were Miranda violations; sixty-five (21%) were confrontation 
clause errors; twenty-six (8%) were right to counsel errors; seventy (22%) were jury instruction errors; 
thirty-one (I 0%) were prosecution errors; twenty-seven (8%) were right to present a defense violations; 
and fifty-three (17%) were other types of errors. 
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Error Types 
Other 
17% 
Miranda Right to 
R-esent 
Defense 
Violation 
Jury 
Instructions 
22% 
TABLE 1 
14% 
Confrontation 
aause 
21% 
8% 
In nearly two out of three analyses, the court found the error to be 
harmless.63 Overall, trial errors were more likely to be held harmless 
(68%), as compared to sentencing errors (49%), which were almost all 
death penalty cases. 64 The nature of the crime also seemed to impact 
· whether or not an alleged error was found to be harmless or harmful: the 
court found 68% of the errors harmless in murder analyses and only 44% in 
non-murder analyses.65 Indeed, three out of four (76%) errors during mur-
der trials were held harmless.66 
There remains little in the way of guidance for how to determine harm-
lessness. Less than 20% of the analyses used a test for determining harm, 
although analyses that cited a test for determining harm were more likely to 
rule that the error was harmful (45%, compared to 32% overall).67 When 
63 In 199 of the analyses, the court ruled the error harmless. In I 00 of the analyses the court found 
the error to be harmful, and in sixteen of the cases the court chose to remand on harm. Because of the 
number of unpublished opinions not included in this analysis, this no doubt understates the overall per-
centage of harmless-error analyses that resulted in a finding of harmlessness. 
64 One hundred fifty-five (68%) of the 227 trial errors were found harmless, sixty-four (28%) were 
harmful and the court remanded in eight (4%) of the cases. In contrast, the sentencing errors were found 
harmless in only thirty-eight (49%) of seventy-seven total and harmful in thirty-two (42%). The court 
remanded seven (9%) of the sentencing errors. 
65 In 172 (68%) of the 253 murder analyses the court found the error harmless, while in seventy 
cases (28%) the error was found harmful, and in eleven (4%) the court remanded on harm. In contrast, 
the court found just twenty-seven (44%) of the non-murder errors harmless, thirty (48%) harmful, and 
remanded on harm in five (8%) of the non-murder analyses. 
66 Of the 170 analyses that were for murder trials, 130 (76%) of the errors were found harmless, 
thirty-seven (22%) of the errors were found harmful, and in three (2%) of the analyses the court re-
manded on harm. 
67 A test was cited in sixty-two (20%) of the 315 analyses. The error was found harmless in thirty-
one (50%) of those analyses, harmful in twenty-eight (45%), and the court remanded on harm in three 
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the violation at issue was a Confrontation Clause violation, the courts fre-
quently used a test for determining harmlessness, with 41% of the Confron-
tation Clause harmless-error analyses citing a test, primarily the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Delaware v. Van Ardsal/.68 Of the rest of the analyses of 
other types of constitutional errors, only 14% employed any test at all. 69 
It is unclear how consistent these decisions are with Supreme Court 
precedent, in part because the Supreme Court precedent is itself inconsistent 
in certain areas. Nonetheless, there is cause for concern. Even after 0' Neal 
ruled otherwise, of the analyses that referenced who bears the risk of uncer-
tainty on harmlessness, more than one in four improperly placed the burden 
on the petitioner.70 Moreover, the extent to which appellate courts weighed 
the evidence indicates that Sixth Amendment boundaries may have been 
crossed. 
( 5%) of these cases. 
68 4 7 5 U.S. 673, 681-82 ( 1986). In Van Ardsa/1, the Court indicated that: 
Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily 
accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness's testimony in 
the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence 
corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-
examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. 
/d. at 684. Of the sixty-four confrontation clause cases, twenty-six (41%) cited a test-mostly this 
one-for determining harm. Only thirty-six of the remaining cases cited a test for determining harm 
(14% of the non-confrontation cases). 
69 Other harmless error tests included those used to evaluate post-arrest silence in violation of Doyle 
v. Ohio, see, e.g., Sallahdin v. Gibson, 275 F.3d 1211, 1230-31 (lOth Cir. 2002), those that use the same 
analysis for whether an erroneous jury instruction constitutes a due process violation, see, e.g., Garceau 
v. Woodford, 275 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2001) (examining the "quality, significance, and pervasive-
ness" of the evidence related to the erroneous instruction), those that evaluate the effect of improper 
prosecutorial comments, see, e.g., Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (declaring 
that "prejudice" analysis on the merits of whether there is a constitutional violation, not harmless error 
analysis per se (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986))); Maurino v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 638, 
647 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Angel v. Overberg, 682 F.2d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 1982) (en bane)), those used 
to evaluate failure to provide defendant with expert psychiatric assistance in capital sentencing proceed-
ing where future dangerousness is at issue, see, e.g., Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 1393 (4th Cir. 
1996) (outlining six-factor test), those that examine whether the alleged introduction to the jury of ex-
trinsic evidence affected the verdict, see Lawson v. Borg, 60 F .3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1995), those used to 
evaluate improper admission of codefendant's confession, see, e.g., Samuels v. Mann, 13 F.3d 522, 
526-27 (2d Cir. 1993), and those that evaluate the erroneous admission of evidence more generally, see, 
e.g., Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 526 (2d Cir. 2000). 
70 See, e.g., Dillard v. Roe, 244 F.3d 758, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e may not grant habeas relief 
unless defendant can establish that as a result of the state trial court's error, he suffered 'actual preju-
dice."'); Doan v. Brigano, 237 F.3d 722,738 (6th Cir. 2001) (stating that "[t]he burden in this analysis is 
on the habeas petitioner, and he has failed to show that the juror misconduct" influenced the verdict); 
Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 2000) (Silverman, J., dissenting in relevant part) ("The 
question is whether the petitioner has carried his burden of proving that [the error] had a substantial and 
injurious effect on the verdict."). Of the 268 post-O'Neal cases, 160 (60%) of the analyses did not men-
tion who the burden was on, 21 (8%) said the burden was on the state, 30 (I I%) said the burden was on 
the petitioner, and 57 (21%) of the cases properly cited O'Neal. 
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Indeed, courts frequently appear to improperly supplement their error 
analyses by weighing the evidence themselves. 71 In the analyses where the 
court weighed the evidence in determining the error's harmlessness, the er-
ror was found harmless in 79% of analyses, while in those where the court 
considered the effect of the error on the two sides' narratives, the error was 
found harmless in just 31% of all analyses.72 Moreover, the reason for de-
termining harmless error was most often that the quality and quantity of the 
evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming ( 48% ), with the error be-
ing irrelevant to the prosecution's case (15%) or the evidence being insig-
nificant (17%) also frequently cited.73 
71 See Whitney v. Horn, 280 F.3d 240, 257 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting argument that erroneous jury 
instruction caused harm on the grounds that no "reasonable jury could have had any doubt about 
whether the defendant was too inebriated to form the intent to kill"); Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 52 
(I st Cir. 200 I) (reasoning that neither eyewitness identifications nor confession evidence were particu-
larly "reliable" or "compelling"); Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 1155, 1165 (8th Cir. 1999) (en bane) 
(finding that the prosecution's expert testimony on critical issue in the case was "more persuasive" and 
"simply makes more sense than the testimony of the other experts," and concluding that "we have no 
difficulty finding that the jury believed [prosecution's expert] over the others"); Lyons v. Johnson, 99 
F.3d 499, 504 (2d Cir. 1996) (fmding harm and noting that "the identifications provided by the prosecu-
tion's eyewitnesses were shaky from the start"); Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1583 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("The conflicting theories and evidence at trial presented a difficult case for 
the fact finder."); Levasseur v. Pepe, 70 F.3d 187, 195 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Was the properly admitted evi-
dence so strong that it overwhelmed the impact of the [error]?"). 
72 In 148 (79%) of the 189 analyses in which the evidence was weighed, the court found the error 
harmless, in thirty-seven (20%) the court found the error harmful, and in four (2%) of the analyses the 
court remanded on harm. In contrast, the court found the error harmless in just sixteen (31 %) of the 
fifty-two analyses where the competing narratives were considered. As Professor Mitchell pointed out 
in his analysis, the difference in outcomes between the two approaches may not be attributable to the 
approaches themselves, but rather the judges may choose the particular approach in part based on their 
predilection to reverse or affirm convictions. Mitchell, supra note 42, at 1352. 
73 Ninety-five (48%) of the harmless analyses were based on the fact that the quality and/or quantity 
of the evidence against the petitioner was overwhelming. In thirty-one (15%) of the harmless analyses 
the reason given was that the error was irrelevant, and in thirty-three (17%) the reason given was that the 
evidence was insignificant. Other reasons cited included that there had been an ameliorating instruction 
given to the jury or that the evidence was cumulative to other evidence admitted. 
The most often cited reason why the error was found harmful was that the error was significant. 
This was the reason given in 45% of cases where the error was harmful. The evidence that was the sub-
ject of the error being significant and the other evidence being weak were also often cited reasons why 
the error was found to be harmful. 
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Reasons for Anding of Harmless Error 
Evidence 
Insignificant 
17% 
15% 
13% 
TABLE 2 
Quality /Quantity 
of Untainted 
Evidence 
48% 
Ameliorating 
Instruction (and 
Other) 
7% 
But the notion that the evidence can be characterized objectively as 
"overwhelming," reflected in many of the 48% of cases referenced above in 
Table 2, is undermined in part by judges frequently having different views 
on the strength of such evidence. 74 
Throughout the cases, empirical assumptions abound about the impact 
of certain kinds of evidence on jurors and appear to be influential in the 
harmless-error analysis. Many courts assume, for example, that jurors fol-
low instructions given to them by the judge, and can ignore both lawyers' 
74 See, e.g., Barrett, 169 F.3d at 1164, 1171 (stating that "[t]his was not a close case," while the dis-
sent quoted three judges of the Iowa Supreme Court describing the case as "obviously close"); Agard v. 
Portuondo, 117 F.3d 696, 705 (2d Cir. 1997) ("On direct review, the Appellate Division characterized 
the evidence of [defendant's] guilt as 'overwhelming.' Having reviewed the entire record of the trial, 
we cannot agree with that characterization."); Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 820 (5th Cir. 1993) (King, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that there is by no means "overwhelming evidence" of defendant's guilt, as the 
majority indicated; Supreme Court reversed in a five-to-four decision, 514 U.S. 419, 454 (1995), with 
majority arguing that this is not the "massive" case the dissent describes); see also Mitchell, supra note 
42, at 1351 (finding that disagreement within the same case about an error's harmful or harmless nature 
was common). 
A friend points out that plenty of people thought the evidence against OJ. Simpson was "over-
whelming," but the jury acquitted. The task on harmless-error analysis is to predict the effect of the er-
ror on the jury, not what the judges think of the evidence. Moreover, before one can characterize the 
evidence as "overwhelming" or anything else, one has to have a theory about whether the evidence is to 
be viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the defense, or somewhere in between. The 
proper approach is not clear from either the case law or scholarship. See, e.g., Rossetti v. Curran, 80 
F.3d I, 18 (1st Cir. 1996) (stating that though the other evidence was "impressive, if taken most favora-
bly to the government," courts doing harmless-error analysis do not look "only at the government's best 
case but rather at the evidence as a whole"). 
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arguments to the contrary75 and their own intuitions.76 One court assumed, 
not unreasonably, that the state's misrepresentation of evidence was influ-
ential. 77 But courts rarely rely on actual social science research about the 
effects of different kinds of evidence, argument, or instructions on jurors. 78 
Indeed, the harmless-error opinions tend to provide little sense of the 
actual trial dynamics in each case. Only one in three of the analyses refer-
ence the opening statements or summations, which frame the case for the 
jury.79 Less than 40% mention the defense theory of the case, either as part 
of the harmless-error analysis or otherwise.80 In other words, many of the 
cases lack a textured sense of the centrality of the error, or the issue it bears 
upon, to the competing narratives that are being put before the jury. 
C. The Effects of Doctrinal Deadlock: Is There a Way Out? 
As expected, the guilt-based and error-based approaches certainly seem 
to lead to very different outcomes. As Table 3 indicates, analyses where a 
guilt-based approach was used by the court during its analysis found the er-
ror harmless 93% of the time, while those using an error-based approach 
found the error harmless only 4 7% of the time. 
75 See. e.g., Caldwell v. Bell, 288 F.3d 838, 845 (6th Cir. 2002) (Norris, J., dissenting) (complaining 
that the majority ignores the fact that in determining the effect that a constitutional instruction has had 
on a verdict, courts are "bound by the presumption that 'juries follow their instructions"' (quoting Wash-
ington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 706 (6th Cir. 2000))). 
76 See, e.g., Whitney, 280 F.3d at 257 (arguing that "expecting jurors' 'common sense' judgment to 
prevail over the court's instructions would conflict with the presumption that juries follow their instruc-
tions"). But see McCracken v. Gibson, 268 F.3d 970, 977 (lOth Cir. 2001) (holding that an unconstitu-
tional "presumed not guilty" instruction had "little, if any" effect on the credibility determination central 
to the decision of guilt). 
77 See, e.g., Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 313 (6th Cir. 2000) ("Misrepresenting facts in evidence 
can amount to substantial error because doing so 'may profoundly impress a jury and may have a sig-
nificant impact on the jury's deliberations."' (quoting Donnelly v. Dechristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646 
(1974))). 
78 Cooper, supra note 26, at 331 (noting that there is "little suggestion" that appellate judges con-
ducting harmless error review rely on the "substantial literature" on jury decisionmaking). This kind of 
research has been used in several isolated instances. See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 305 
(I 999) (Souter, 1., dissenting) (relying in part on empirical study for the proposition that guilt-phase evi-
dence and arguments will often significantly affect jurors' choice of sentence (citing William J. Bowers 
et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in Capital Sentencing: Jurors' Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, 
and Premature Decision Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476, 1486-96 (1998))); Rice v. Wood, 77 F.3d 
1138, 1142-43 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (en bane) (Kozinski, J.) (citing a study that found conviction rates 
in robbery and burglary cases were 40% to 180% higher where there is a confession and comparing this 
strong evidence of causal impact with the "mere dram of authority supporting the view that defendant 
suffers any concrete harm whatever by being absent when the jury returns" its verdict, the issue in the 
case at bar). 
79 The summation/opening was mentioned in ninety-seven (31 %) of the analyses. 
80 The defense theory of the case was mentioned in just 110 (38%) of the analyses. 
1071 
c 
0 
·u; 
·c:; 
Cll 
c 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 
Decision in Guilt-Based 
vs. Error-Based Analyses 
Rermnd on Harm f! 8 
Harmul ~~ ..... 45 
Ji.IO I 
47 
Harmess w , 'tt~'' :JJF ':nw J?i ':;;rrn:<JJI 9p 
I 
0 20 40 60 80 1 00 
Percentage Harmless/Harmful 
TABLE3 
• Error-Based 
IJ Guilt-Based 
In cases where the majority and dissent differ on the harmlessness of 
the error, it frequently seems that they are talking about two entirely differ-
ent trials, or that they simply have very different perspectives on the same 
trial. Most of the time, one side is using the guilt-based approach, and the 
other the error-based approach. Is there any principled common ground, or 
is this just results-oriented jurisprudence at work, with judges choosing the 
approach to use based on their desired outcome, in turn determined by their 
ideology or view of factual guilt? 
To search for a way forward, it makes sense to return to first principles, 
starting with the language of Brecht. In determining whether the "error" 
brought about "harm," according to the Court in Brecht, the judge is to de-
termine whether the error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence 
in determining the jury's verdict."81 So to determine the connection be-
tween the "error"-not a mistake but a deviation by the judge or prosecu-
tion from constitutionally mandated duties to a criminal defendant-and the 
"harm" (the conviction), one must look to effect's necessary antecedent, 
"cause." A breach of duty, resulting harm, and an inquiry into the causal 
connection-harmless-error analysis starts to sound less like the law of 
constitutional criminal procedure, or even remedies, and more like tort law. 
In Part IV, I reconceptualize harmless-error as a constitutional tort, and con-
sider whether this can bring conceptual clarity and doctrinal consensus. 
81 Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,638 (1993). 
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IV. BRINGING THE LENS OF TORT LAW TO HARMLESS ERROR 
A. Habeas as a Constitutional Tort 
The universe of "constitutional torts" is generally thought to consist of 
those claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute. This 
is sensible, as tort claims are normally claims for damages, which § 1983 
authorizes. Bringing a writ of habeas corpus, of course, is not asking for 
compensation; rather, the writ seeks the remedy offreedom.82 Nonetheless, 
the notion of a habeas claim as a tort claim is both conceptually coherent 
and practically usefuP3 
After all, the basic claim at the heart of every habeas petition is that the 
petitioner's rights were violated in some fashion at trial, which caused his 
conviction. So when a prisoner brings a habeas claim against the state, all 
the elements of a tort claim are present: ( 1) duty (of the state to provide pe-
titioner with a criminal trial that conforms to constitutional procedure); (2) 
breach of duty (the constitutional violation); (3) causation (the error tilting 
the jury toward guilt); and (4) harm (conviction). In this context, harmless 
error is an affirmative defense to the constitutional tort claim, a characteri-
zation that has considerable support from two main strands in the case law: 
the cases culminating in 0' Neal that place the burden of uncertainty of 
harmlessness on the state, and the cases holding that the state has waived 
any harmless-error defense if not raised in a timely fashion.84 
Though the tort law analogy in harmless-error analysis is largely unex-
plored,85 it did play a role in the 1995 Supreme Court case O'Neal v. McAn-
inch.86 O'Neal turned on who bore the burden of demonstrating harm in a 
federal habeas case: was it the petitioner's burden to persuade the judge 
that the error had a "substantial and injurious" effect on the verdict, or was 
it the state's burden to persuade the judge that the error was harmless? The 
critical issue in the case centered on causation. 
82 See Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 25, at 1804 ("Many constitutional tort actions ... involve re-
quests for injunctions."); Daniel J. Meltzer, Harmless Error and Constitutional Remedies, 61 U. CHI. L. 
REv. I, 29 (1994) ("An appellant attacking an adverse judgment is seeking affirmative relief against a 
past wrong, not unlike a plaintiff suing the government for damages in a constitutional tort action."). 
83 Cf United States v. Johnson, 380 F.3d 1013 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (arguing that the inde-
pendent-source and inevitable-discovery doctrines in Fourth Amendment law are "easily collapsed into 
the familiar rule of tort law that a person can't complain about a violation of his rights if the same injury 
would have occurred even if they had not been violated"). 84 Another way of thinking about the habeas claim and the harmless-error defense is with reference 
to burden-shifting on the issue of causation. If the petitioner raises a claim that his constitutional rights 
were violated at trial, a determination by a judge that there was constitutional error shifts the burden of 
persuasion on causation to the state to negate the presumption that the error caused the harm. The harm-
less-error inquiry then focuses on causation: whether the error caused the conviction. 85 But see Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error and Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 
2005 WIS. L. REv. (forthcoming) (comparing the harmless-error inquiry to the causation element in a 
§ 1983 wrongful conviction claim). 
86 513 U.S. 432 (1995). 
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The state argued, supported by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae, 
that the language of the federal habeas statute with respect to state prison-
ers-"in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the 
United States"87-meant that a "causal link" is required "between the viola-
tion and the custody."88 The habeas petitioner is bringing a civil action as a 
plaintiff, and according to basic tenets of civil procedure and evidence, 
should bear the risk of non-persuasion. Siding with this argument in his 
dissent, Justice Thomas cited to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, quoting 
the statement that "[t]he burden of proof that the tortious conduct of the de-
fendant has caused the harm to the plaintiff is upon the plaintiff."89 Justice 
Thomas pointed out that by discussing "harmful errors as opposed to mere 
errors," the majority "implicitly agrees that causation is necessary."90 
Justice Thomas is clearly right that treating only harmful errors as wor-
thy of a remedy necessarily implies the need for a causal connection be-
tween the error and the conviction. However, there is no reason why the 
burden necessarily must be on the petitioner to demonstrate causation. And 
after considering the "basic purposes underlying the writ of habeas cor-
pus,"91 the Court held that if "in the judge's mind, the matter is so evenly 
balanced that he feels himself in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness of 
the error,"92 then the error will be considered harmful, and the conviction 
overturned. 
Though an important clarification of the law (the circuits were split on 
this issue before 0' Neal), 0' Neal got somewhat lost between Brecht's ap-
plication of a more prosecution-friendly standard to constitutional errors in 
1993, and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's 
("AEDP A") significant reshuffling of the habeas landscape in 1996. As a 
result, the broader implications of the tort law analogy described in 0' Neal 
have been ignored by judges and scholars.93 Regardless of who bears the 
risk of uncertainty, both the majority and the dissent implicitly seemed to 
agree: the harmless-error analysis is the causation inquiry in the habeas 
version of a constitutional tort claim. As the Court in Brecht explains the 
87 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (2000). 
88 513 U.S. at 446. 
89 !d. 
90 !d. 
91 Id. at 442. 
92 !d. at 435. 
93 Writing before 0' Neal was decided, Professors Fallon and Meltzer, in a footnote, had considered 
the possibility that harmless error analysis could be seen as "a species of causation doctrine at the post-
conviction stage, rather than as a remedial doctrine." Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 25, at 1772 & n.222. 
But they rejected the suggestion on several grounds, primarily because harmless error analysis had a 
more stringent standard for constitutional errors-a distinction with no particular relation to causation 
and because violations of some rights were subject to automatic reversal. Since their article, however, 
Brecht lowered the standard for constitutional errors, and the number of rights subject to harmless error 
analysis has continued to expand, undercutting these reasons. 
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nature of the inquiry, the judge must ask whether the error had a "substan-
tial and injurious effect" on the jury's verdict.94 In tort law terms, did the 
error cause the petitioner's conviction? 
B. The Doctrinal Deadlock: Reflecting Different Tort-Law Approaches to 
Factual Causation 
But what does it mean for an error to cause a conviction? Understand-
ing what constitutes "cause-in-fact," otherwise referred to as "factual causa-
tion" or "actual causation," has vexed torts scholars and judges for years.95 
For much of the first two centuries of American law, the "but for" test was 
the sine qua non of factual causation.96 In the first Restatement of Torts, the 
"substantial factor" test was adopted primarily for the proximate cause in-
quiry, but was soon applied to cause-in-fact with many jurisdictions follow-
ing suit.97 In recent years, however, the pendulum has swung the other way, 
with the "substantial factor" test roundly criticized as indeterminate and un-
helpful. As the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts puts it, "[t]he substantial-
factor test has not ... withstood the test of time, proving confusing and be-
ing rnisused."98 Accordingly, the draft Restatement (Third) of Torts section 
on factual causation eliminates any reference to the "substantial factor" test 
for most types of cases-a major change in doctrine. The "but for" test is 
once more in ascendance.99 
The "but for" causation inquiry is the essence of counterfactual reason-
94 This phrase was borrowed from Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946). 
95 For an overview of the debates on factual causation, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS 
AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW (2d ed. 2002); ARNO C. BECHT & FRANK W. MILLER, THE TEST OF 
FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY CASES (1961); H.L.A. HART & TONY 
HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); ROBERT E. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF 
TORTS (1963); Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In Fact, 9 STAN. L. REv. 60 (1957). 
96 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL HARM (BASIC PRINCIPLES)§ 26 
cmt. b (tentative draft no. 2, 2002) (explaining that "but-for" test means that "an act is a factual cause of 
an outcome if, in the absence of the act, the outcome would not have occurred") [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]. 
97 See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1735, 1781-84 (1985) (describ-
ing the origin of the substantial-factor test as a guide for resolving proximate cause issues and its subse-
quent application to factual causation through the influential Prosser treatise on torts); John D. Rue, 
Note, Returning to the Roots of the Bramble Bush: The "but for" Test Regains Primacy in Causal 
Analysis in the American Law Institute's Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2679, 2687-93 (2003) (describing the rise of the "substantial factor" test); see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD), supra note 96, § 26 reporters' note cmt. j (noting that in first two versions of the Restatement of 
Torts, the substantial-factor test appears also to be doing "proximate-cause duty"). 
98 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 96, § 26 cmt. j. In virtually all cases, the Restatement 
drafters decided that the "substantial-factor" test provided "nothing of use in determining whether fac-
tual cause exists." !d. § 26 reporters' note cmt. j. 
99 See id. § 26 reporters' note cmt. j (noting that the substantial-factor test has "few supporters" 
among commentators, and citing the critics); David A. Fischer, Causation in Fact in Omission Cases, 
1992 UTAH L. REv. 1335, 1338 (noting that the but-for test "is the most widely accepted test for deter-
mining cause in fact"). 
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ing. As one scholar has described it, the but-for test "instructs the fact 
finder to re-create an imaginative past, in which the fact finder eliminates 
the tortious act and plays out an alternative (counterfactual) history."100 
Harmless-error cases using the guilt-based approach employ similar reason-
ing, determining whether, if not for the error, the defendant would have 
been convicted. On the other hand, the error-based approach asks not a 
counterfactual question but a historical one--essentially, was the error a 
"substantial factor" in the jury's verdict? 101 
Indeed, the debate among tort scholars between those who would em-
phasize a "but for" approach to causation, as opposed to those who prefer a 
"substantial-factor" formulation, mirrors the difference between the guilt-
based and error-based approaches. Under the guilt-based approach, the de-
fendant will be denied a remedy if the state can persuade the judge that the 
defendant would have been convicted despite the constitutional error. On 
the other hand, under the error-based approach, as long as the petitioner can 
persuade the judge that the error was a "substantial factor" contributing to 
the conviction, the judge will order a new trial without asking whether the 
defendant would have been convicted absent the error. 
The difference between the two approaches to causation is highlighted 
by the difference between the majority and dissent in a Fourth Circuit death 
penalty case eventually decided en bane, Cooper v. Taylor. 102 In this mur-
der trial, the key prosecution evidence was three confessions-two of which 
the jury heard through the testimony of the officers who allegedly heard 
them, and the third a tape-recorded confession that was played for the jury 
while they followed along with the transcript. On habeas review, the third 
confession was judged improperly admitted, as it was taken after the defen-
dant requested the presence of a lawyer. 103 
For the majority, the "obvious power" of the two other confessions, 
along with the other "overwhelming evidence" of guilt, led to the conclu-
sion that the guilty verdict "could not have more fairly represented the facts 
of record."104 In other words, take away the improperly admitted confes-
sion, and the defendant is still clearly found guilty based on the properly 
admitted evidence. Indeed, this is quite consistent with the counterfactual 
"but for" test of causation reflected in the majority of the post-Brecht cases 
that employ a "guilt-based" approach to harmless error. 
Rather than reason counterfactually, and consider the hypothetical trial 
without the error, the dissenting judges looked historically at the actual trial 
100 Robert N. Strassfeld, If . .. : Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 339, 346 
(1992). 
101 But see Cooper, supra note 26, at 334 (arguing that both approaches require judges to engage in 
"problematic counterfactual reasoning"). 
102 103 F.3d 366 (4th Cir. 1996) (en bane). 
103 /d. at 367-{)8. 
104 /d. at 370--71. 
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that did take place, and asked whether the improperly admitted confession 
had a "substantial and injurious" influence on the verdict. In other words, 
they applied the "substantial factor" test for factual causation, where the 
question of what would have happened if the jury had only considered 
properly admitted evidence is irrelevant. Consistent with such an analysis, 
the dissenting judges observed that the taped and erroneously admitted con-
fession was "the undeniable centerpiece of the state's case."105 Judge Ham-
ilton, one of the dissenting judges, went so far as to say that: 
[I]f the erroneous admission of the taped confession in Cooper's trial did not 
have substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict, then no 
evidence erroneously admitted could ever be found to have such an effect or 
influence where there is independent evidence of guilt in the record. 106 
Judge Motz, another dissenter, took on the guilt-based "but for" ap-
proach quite directly, arguing that the majority "applies the wrong legal 
analysis-whether there was sufficient evidence of guilt without the erro-
neously admitted taped confession-to arrive at the wrong result."107 Judge 
Motz described the approach taken by the majority as "excis[ing]" the de-
fendant's taped confession ("but for") and considering only the properly 
admitted evidence. 108 With this approach, Judge Motz asserted, the majority 
"unequivocally demonstrates its lack of understanding of harmless-error re-
view."109 
Because the prosecution relied heavily on the taped confession at trial 
(referencing it fifteen different times during summation), the difference be-
tween the majority and dissent in understanding what factual causation 
means--or, more precisely, how to apply it in the harmless-error context-
clearly accounts for the different conclusions reached by the majority and 
dissent in this case. Though the majority and dissent in Cooper put in stark 
relief the difference between the "guilt-based" approach and the "error-
based" approach to harmless error, and their close cousins the "but for" test 
and the "substantial factor" test for causation, these differences are just be-
neath the surface throughout other post-Brecht cases. 
C. A Hybrid Approach to Factual Causation in Criminal Trials 
Having identified the normative ideal of determining cause-in-fact with 
respect to the constitutional error, the remaining question for harmless-error 
doctrine is a pragmatic one: what is the best way to determine factual cau-
105 !d. at 374 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
106 /d. at 375. 
107 /d. 
108 /d. at 376. 
109 /d. at 382. Judge Motz also argued that the majority failed to follow the proper mode of analysis 
in "the most basic manner: the majority never once discusses the effect the error had on the jury at the 
trial that Cooper actually received." /d. at 376. Instead, she argues later, the majority "conducts its own 
hypothetical trial." !d. at 3 79. 
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sation when looking at constitutional errors in criminal trials? Professor 
Jane Stapleton, a leading torts scholar, describes the common ground of 
cause-in-fact in a way that is useful here: that the breach of duty "played a 
role in the history ofthe transition to that injury."110 In this section, drawing 
on lessons from tort theory and doctrine, I argue that a hybrid of the two 
approaches, though closer to the "substantial-factor" end of the spectrum, 
should be used to determine whether the constitutional error played such a 
role. 
If we view harmless-error analysis as the question of factual causation 
in criminal trials, then perhaps we ought to follow the latest Restatement 
and employ a "but for" approach to harmless error-whether we call it the 
"overwhelming evidence" approach, guilt-based approach, or "hypothetical 
outcome" approach. The "substantial factor" test has outlived its useful-
ness, or so the Restatement drafters tell us. 111 
The problem is that in cases of overdetermined causation, or multiple 
sufficient causes, the "but for" inquiry does not work very well in identify-
ing legally relevant causal factors. 112 In such cases, scholars and judges 
agree, the "substantial factor" test works much better than the "but for" test 
in determining cause-in-fact, 113 and indeed convictions at criminal trials fit 
110 Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences, 54 
V AND. L. REV. 947, 958 (2001 ). But Stapleton is quick to point out that the rub arises when figuring out 
how to test this, referring to the traditional but-for test as "notoriously inadequate for this purpose," par-
ticularly in the case of overdetermined events. !d. Stapleton proposes a "targeted but-for test," which 
works by taking all the factors existing at the time of the transition to injury, removing one at a time, and 
considering whether the further removal of the factor in which we are interested leaves a set of remain-
ing factors that would not have produced the injury. /d. at 959. If so, Stapleton says, then that factor 
played a role in the history of the transition to that injury. Stapleton describes this approach as building 
on the "necessary element of a sufficient set" test formulated by H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honore, and fur-
ther developed by Richard Wright. /d. She also points out that this kind of testing is consistent with 
much scientific experimental design. !d. at 960 n.44. 
111 See supra note 98 and accompanying text. 
112 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 96, § 27 reporters' note cmt. a ("There is near-universal 
support recognizing the inappropriateness of the but-for standard for factual causation when multiple 
sufficient causal sets exist."); David A. Fischer, Successive Causes and the Enigma of Duplicated Harm, 
66 TENN. L. REv. 1127, 1129 (1999) ("In multiple sufficient cause cases, the 'but for' test cannot iden-
tify which event caused an injury because each of the multiple forces alone was sufficient to cause the 
injury."); Rue, supra note 97, at 2687 ("In the hard cases, however, where cause-in-fact is not intuitively 
clear, the 'but for' test can be ineffective."). 
113 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 96, § 26 cmt. j (explaining that the "primary function" of 
the substantial factor test was to permit the fact finder "to decide that factual cause existed when there 
were overdetermined causes--each of two separate causal chains sufficient to bring about the plaintiffs 
harm, thereby rendering neither a but-for cause"); Fischer, supra note 112, at 1130 (_"'In lieu of 'but for' 
causation in multiple sufficient cause cases ... courts require the jury to find that the tortfeasor's con-
duct was a 'substantial factor' in producing the harm."); Rue, supra note 97, at 2693 ('"The strongest ar-
gument for the 'substantial factor' doctrine can be found in cases of multiple sufficient causes."); see 
also Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 389 n.6 (2d Cir. 1998) (Calabresi, J.) ("Many courts 
long ago abandoned the requirement of but for cause in situations where, since the negligence of any one 
of several defendants was sufficient to cause the harm, the negligence of none was its necessary 
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precisely in that category. In other words, the only category of cases where 
"substantial factor" is the best test to use in determining factual causation, 
according to leading commentators, is one that just happens to include 
harmless-error analysis. 
Consider the paradigmatic example of "overdetermined harm," or mul-
tiple sufficient causes-the classic "two-fires" case familiar to first-year 
torts alums. 114 This case, credited with first adopting the substantial-factor 
test, 115 involved two separate fires that joined together and burned the plain-
tiffs property. Either of the fires was sufficient to cause the harm. A strict 
application of the "but-for" test would result in no liability for the defendant 
railroad that negligently started one of the fires. But this result of course 
seems anomalous, because it would mean that the innocent plaintiff would 
bear the full cost of the harm, despite at least one tortious actor. Moreover, 
it seems to make little sense to say that neither fire caused the damage. 116 
As a result, the Minnesota Supreme Court in the two-fires case used the 
"substantial-factor" test as a substitute for the "but-for" test to determine 
cause-in-fact in this circumstance, leading to liability for the negligent rail-
road.117 
Harmless-error analysis presents just such a "multiple sufficient 
causes" scenario. Consider first the extreme rarity of courts overturning 
convictions based on sufficiency of evidence grounds. Assume that courts 
are discharging the responsibility seriously in denying nearly all such 
claims, and ask why that is. Intuitively, the answer is that there is almost 
always more than enough evidence to convict; the question is whether the 
jury credits enough of it to get over the "beyond a reasonable doubt" 
threshold. When observed from a factual causation perspective, then, 
criminal trials are almost always overdetermined causation cases. The ones 
that are barely determined don't get brought to trial. 
Rarely is any one piece of evidence necessary to satisfy an element of 
the crime. If there are three witnesses, and two pieces of physical evidence, 
removing one may still result in conviction. "But for" causation in the strict 
sense will not be satisfied. But that does not mean that that one piece of 
evidence did not "cause" the conviction. The jury may have discredited 
some witnesses' testimony, and credited others. But we would not say that 
the particular piece of evidence did not factually cause the conviction sim-
ply because the conviction could have occurred without it. 118 Moreover, a 
cause."). 114 Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S.M. Ry. Co., 179N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920). 115 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 96, § 26 reporters' note cmt. j. 116 See id. § 27 cmt. c ("Multiple sufficient causes are also factual causes because we recognize 
them as such in our common understanding of causation, even if the but-for standard does not."). 117 See id. § 26 reporters' note cmt. j ("In the instance of multiple sufficient causes, however, the 
substantial-factor test can be useful because it substitutes for the but-for test in a situation in which the 
but-for test fails to accomplish what law demands."). 118 Another way of getting at the same idea would be to consider the harm as a type of "lost oppor-
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strict "but-for" test in this circumstance would provide perverse incentives 
for prosecutors who think they have strong cases (i.e., harmful error-proof) 
to commit or fail to avoid constitutional violations. 119 
Determining factual causation in a criminal trial with reference to any 
particular piece of evidence, then, presents the familiar problem from tort 
law of multiple sufficient causes. Strict application of the "but-for" test 
would lead to the anomalous result that perhaps none of the individual 
pieces of evidence, even if all actually playing a significant role in the 
jury's decision to convict, would be considered harmful, because the jury 
could have convicted on the basis of the remaining evidence. Like tort law, 
the "substantial-factor" test appears to fare better than the "but-for" test in 
determining the causal relationship in which we are interested. 
But harmless-error analysis is also a particular kind of "multiple suffi-
cient causes" case, where torts plaintiffs get somewhat less sympathy from 
the courts when they cannot satisfY the "but-for" test. It is a case where one 
of the "sufficient causal sets" is innocent, not tortious. That is, the prosecu-
tion's properly admitted evidence appropriately contributed to, and proba-
bly also "caused," the conviction.120 Returning to the two-fires analogy, 
assume that one of the fires started from natural causes, not negligent con-
duct. Courts typically still find liability in this circumstance, though not as 
often as when both causes are tortious. 121 And one of the reasons for find-
ing liability in a typical tort claim like this is absent in harmless-error analy-
sis: when choosing between a tortious defendant and innocent plaintiff to 
bear the cost of the harm, equitable principles weigh in favor of liability. 
Here, though, society wants the petitioner to bear the harm (serve his prison 
sentence) if, absent the error, the jury would have convicted. Otherwise, 
petitioner would get an undeserved "windfall," in tort-law terms. 122 The 
case for simply using the "substantial-factor'' test, then, is less strong than 
was initially apparent from the multiple sufficient cause analogy. 
Perhaps an even more apt analogy than the two-fires case is the mixed-
motive analysis used in constitutional tort and Title VII employment dis-
crimination cases. 123 Under the regime established by Mount Healthy City 
tunity" or "lost chance" of demonstrating innocence or being acquitted. This is analogous to tort cases 
where the harm is a lost opportunity for cure of a medical condition. See id. § 26 cmt. n. 
119 Cf Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 
43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69, 86-87 (1976) (arguing that in multiple sufficient cause cases, it is "at the very 
least, doubtful whether blind adherence to the requirement that the victim prove a but for relationship 
serves the purposes of market deterrence"). 
120 It has long been accepted that more than one factor may be considered the "cause" of harm. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 96, § 26 cmts. c, d. 
121 See id. § 27 reporters' note crnt. d. 
122 See Stephen D. Sugarman, Rethinking Tort Doctrine: Visions of a Restatement (Fourth) of 
Torts, 50 UCLA L. REv. 585, 606 (2002) (pointing out that in such circumstances, holding the negligent 
party liable means putting the victim back "in a better position than he/she would have been in absent 
the defendant's negligence"). 
123 I am grateful to Rebecca White and Cindy Estlund for suggesting this analogy in the Title VII 
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School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 124 a plaintiff alleging First 
Amendment-based retaliation must show that his constitutionally protected 
conduct was a "substantial factor" in the adverse decision taken against 
him. At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant, who can still avoid 
liability by showing that "it would have reached the same decision ... even 
in the absence of the protected conduct."125 This analytical framework was 
subsequently applied to other constitutional tort claims and adopted in the 
Title VII context as well. 126 But after the Supreme Court relied on Mount 
Healthy to justify a "but for" test for causation to determine Title VII liabil-
ity,127 Congress changed the rule as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In 
that Act, Congress created a rule holding the defendant liable if the dis-
criminatory reason was the "motivating factor" in the adverse employment 
action. However, Congress also allowed the employer to use the "same de-
cision" affirmative defense-essentially disproving "but for" causation-to 
avoid a variety of remedies, including reinstatement. 128 
The nature of the employer's defense here is the same as the harmless-
error defense used by the state-just as the employee would have been fired 
anyway, despite the discriminatory motive-the defendant would have been 
convicted anyway, despite the constitutional error. The task of the judge is 
also similar. In both cases, the judge has the task of discerning the relative 
importance of the innocent factor (proper evidence in harmless-error analy-
sis; permissible reason for adverse employment action in Title VII analysis) 
and the tortious factor (constitutional violation in harmless-error analysis; 
impermissible motive such as race or gender in Title VII analysis, or pro-
tected speech in First Amendment retaliation cases) in bringing about the 
harm. 
Based on these similarities, one could argue that courts should import 
this "modified but-for" approach to mixed-motive causation to the harm-
less-error context. But it is a more uncertain prospect to determine the state 
context. 
124 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
125 /d. at 287; see also Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 
n.21 (1977) (noting in dicta that Mt. Healthy approach would apply in equal protection context). The 
Mt. Healthy approach to causation in constitutional tort law is discussed in Michael Wells, Three Argu-
ments Against Mt. Healthy: Tort Theory, Constitutional Torts, and Freedom of Speech, 51 MERCER L. 
REv. 583 (2000). See also Thomas A. Eaton, Causation in Constitutional Torts, 67 IOWA L. REV. 443 
(1982). 
126 See Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed Motive 
Discrimination, 68 N.C. L. REv. 495, 522 (1990). For an overview of mixed-motive doctrine, see Peter 
Siegelman, Un-Muddling Mixed-Motives?: Protection for the Non-Exemplary Worker (draft of October 
12, 2004), and for a critique of mixed-motive analysis, see Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Male-
ness: A Critical View of Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. 
REv. 1029, 1074-76 (arguing that mixed-motive analysis undetrmines both the compensation and deter-
rence objectives of antidiscrimination legislation). 
127 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
128 Pub. L. No. 102-166, Sec. 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)). 
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of mind of jurors, as compared to decisionmakers in the workplace, and 
therefore more difficult to determine whether the outcome would have been 
the same absent the impermissible factor. In an employment discrimination 
case, the fact-finder can listen to witness testimony and make direct credi-
bility judgments. Whereas in harmless-error analysis, the jurors are neither 
deposed nor put on the stand, and their thought processes forever remain a 
source of pure speculation. 
In my view, there is a better way to combine the two approaches to fac-
tual causation in this context: specifically, I propose a hybrid approach that 
employs historical reasoning, like the "substantial-factor" test, but considers 
the strength of the prosecution's case as a factor, like the "but-for" test. 
For several reasons, a judge's harmless-error analysis ought to be his-
torical, like the substantial-factor test, not counterfactual, like the "but-for" 
test. First, the plain language of Brecht and Kotteakos seems to support this 
kind of historical reasoning by asking the empirical question of the "effect" 
the error "had" on the verdict. Justice Breyer puts the historical question 
most plainly in 0' Neal when he asks: "Do I, the judge, think that the error 
substantially influenced the jury's decision?"129 
Second, Sixth Amendment values weigh heavily in favor of historical, 
not counterfactual, analysis. Under "but for" analysis, the judge must liter-
ally run a hypothetical trial to determine whether, under the counterfactual 
scenario, the defendant is still convicted. Though the historical inquiry is 
not without its own uncertainty, the question is what impact the error had 
on the actual jury that decided the defendant's case in accordance with his 
Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 130 One might argue that inevitably, 
the harmless-error analysis involves some appellate weighing of the evi-
dence-if nothing else, to determine whether the error was "substantial" 
and "injurious," as Brecht and Kotteakos mandate-and so in terms of Sixth 
Amendment offensiveness the two tests differ in degree, but not in kind. 131 
But this understates the difference in the reasoning involved in the two tests 
of factual causation. 
Third, the empirical uncertainty surrounding causal relationships in 
criminal trials argues for historical reasoning, which though speculative, is 
129 O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432,436 (1995). 
130 See Richard W. Wright, Causation, Responsibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and 
Proof Pruning the Bramble Bush by ClarifYing the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REv. 1001, 1041 (1988) 
(criticizing scholars who assume that "the causal inquiry is concerned with all the hypothetical scenarios 
that might have happened, rather than with determining the causal processes at work in the one scenario 
that did happen"). As Professor Leon Green put it, referring to the but-for test, "tests of this character 
have the same vice as any 'if,' or any analogy. They take the eye off the ball." Leon Green, The Causal 
Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L. REV. 543, 556 (1962). 
131 Though disagreeing with the guilt-based approach, Chief Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Cir-
cuit acknowledged that "more often than not, we review the record to determine how we might have de-
cided the case; the judgment as to whether an error is harmless is therefore dependent on our judgment 
about the factual guilt of the defendant." Edwards, supra note 28, at 1171. 
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grounded in the actual trial, as opposed to counterfactual reasoning, which 
imagines a hypothetical trial. As discussed in more detail below,132 cogni-
tive and experimental psychology, behavioral decision theory, evidence 
scholarship, and other disciplines have provided models for how jurors 
process information and make decisions. But none of the models have tre-
mendous predictive power. That is, we have little ability to hypothetically 
go back and change one variable in the cauldron of evidence presented to 
the jury, and have any confidence in what the impact of that change might 
be. This level of uncertainty is a magnitude or two greater than the factual 
uncertainty presented in a typical tort case, for example, because our causal 
generalizations about the impact of evidence on juries are so poorly devel-
oped in comparison to cases of physical injury.133 Relying on counterfactual 
reasoning under conditions of such empirical uncertainty carries too high a 
risk of inaccurate determinations of harm. 
Finally, as we saw in the two-fires case, counterfactual reasoning is 
particularly poor in identifying factual causes in "overdetermined causa-
tion" cases. As a result, one leading torts theorist, Professor Stephen Perry, 
recently proposed a "historical worsening" test for harm in tort law. 134 Un-
der the counterfactual test, the relevant interest subsequent to a particular 
event is compared to a hypothetical condition of that interest if the event 
had never occurred.135 Perry's historical worsening test, however, is more 
straightforward: it simply compares the relevant interest subsequent to a 
particular event to the condition of the interest prior to the event. If the in-
terest has been affected adversely, then harm has been caused. 136 In the 
harmless-error context, the relevant interest is the probability of conviction. 
If that probability increased as a result of the constitutional error, the error 
would be harmful under this type of historical worsening analysis. 
Nonetheless, strict application of a "historical worsening" test does not 
fully capture the Brecht inquiry and the question of factual causation. Ap-
plied literally, it would mean that any worsening in the probability of con-
viction would lead to a conclusion of factual cause. But such a result is 
132 See infra Part IV. 
133 As Richard Wright has pointed out, causal analysis relies upon and is limited by "our empirical 
knowledge of the conditions that actually existed on the particular occasion and the possibly applicable 
causal generalizations." Wright, supra note 130, at I 042. Indeed, the limits to our empirical knowledge 
in both of these areas is what makes the harmless-error inquiry so difficult. 
134 See Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1283 (2003). 
135 See, e.g., JOEL FEINBERG, Wrongful Life and the Counierfactual Element in Harming, in 
FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS 3 (1992). 
136 In significant part, Perry reaches the conclusion that the historical worsening test is a superior al-
ternative to determining harm by considering the two fires case. Under the counterfactual test, as we 
have discussed, one would reach the anomalous result that neither of the two fires caused harm to the 
property owner. To avoid such a result, Perry proposes historical worsening. See Perry, supra note 134, 
at 1286-87. But see John C.P. Goldberg, Rethinking Injury and Proximate Cause, 40 SAN DIEGO L. 
REv. 1315, 1320 (2003) (arguing that the two tests "overlap considerably, especially in the tort con-
text"). 
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inconsistent with Brecht's description of the magnitude of the effect as 
"substantial and injurious," and risks an undesirable result in this situation 
of"one innocent, one tortious" sufficient causes. 
Here is where an important aspect of the "but-for" test, or guilt-based 
approach to harmless error, comes in. To be sure, a significant part of as-
sessing whether there was "substantial and injurious" effect is performed by 
looking at the error itself, but the judge should also assess the probability of 
conviction before the error. If the "innocent" cause-the properly admitted 
prosecution evidence-actually accounts for the conviction, then we ought 
not to be worried about accurate determination of guilt, and the conviction 
should be upheld. If the error occurred late in the trial, for example, when 
the jurors may have already come to a view of the case, then it may be right 
to say that the error did not "play a role in the history of the transition to the 
injury," to use Stapleton's terms. The problem is that in many cases, it is 
frequently difficult to assess the strength of the prosecution's case from the 
perspective of the jury. 
Nonetheless, some assessment of the strength of the prosecution's case 
is appropriate and usually necessary. Indeed, even those that support the 
"error-based" approach have occasionally conceded as such. 137 The impact 
of the error necessarily depends in part on the strength of the prosecution's 
case versus the strength of the defense case, and how the error plays into 
that choice for the jury. So evidence of guilt cannot and should not be ig-
nored. The existing evidence of guilt can and should be considered as a 
factor (but not the only factor) to make inferences about the causal effect of 
the error. 
By combining this aspect of the guilt-based approach to harmless error, 
or the "but-for" analysis in torts, with the historical reasoning employed in 
the error-based approach, or the "substantial-factor" test in tort law, we can 
137 See Cooper, supra note 26, at 328-29 (pointing out that some judges may be using the strength 
of the evidence as a "proxy" for a conclusion that the jury was unaffected by the error); Edwards, supra 
note 28, at 1187 (acknowledging that the "presence of massive evidence of the defendant's guilt surely 
is one factor for a court to consider" in determining harmless error). Even Justice Brennan's dissent in 
Harrington v. California acknowledged that some appellate assessment of the remaining evidence was 
inevitable, arguing that the "focus of appellate inquiry should be on the character and quality of the 
tainted evidence as it relates to the untainted evidence and not just on the amount of untainted evidence." 
395 U.S. 250, 256 (1969) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In several post-Brecht cases, judicial assessment of 
the weakness of the evidence led to a fmding of harm. See Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 653 (9th Cir. 
2002) ("Given the paucity in the phySical and eyewitness testimony, one can infer that the evidence con-
cerning Gray's anger toward his wife and motive for murdering her ... was of great importance in the 
jury's deliberations."); Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding of harm based 
in part on the weakness of the case, specifically empirical assumption that "in a case in which the State's 
evidence consists largely of the uncorroborated testimony of a person who himself had both a motive 
and the opportunity to commit the crime, there is a greater likelihood that any error will be prejudicial"); 
Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 320 (6th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, because the State had "no evidence to 
rebut [defendant's] showing of insanity," "the Confrontation Clause violation likely stood in the way of 
an acquittal for reason of insanity"). 
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move past the doctrinal deadlock, and judges can more accurately achieve 
the shared normative ideal in harmless-error analysis of determining 
whether the error caused the conviction. 
V. DEMONSTRATING CAUSATION: PRESCRIPTION FOR DOCTRINE AND 
PRACTICE 
Thus far, causation has played both a positive and normative role. The 
positive account is that different understandings of the necessary causation 
for harmless error-"but for" or "substantial factor"-help explain different 
approaches taken in harmless-error analysis. And I have proposed a hybrid 
approach to factual causation to be used going forward. 
In this section, I move from the theoretical to the practical, and explain 
what judges should look at in doing this type of analysis. This section ad-
dresses the central problem underlying harmless-error analysis that has been 
ignored by scholars struggling with the morass of standards and ap-
proaches: How exactly do you figure out whether an error has caused a 
conviction? In other words, settling on the analytic framework of causation 
is a useful and critical step, but it is not enough. To maximize our chances 
of accurate determinations of harm, we must turn our attention to what I call 
the "causal laws of criminal trials." 
A. The Causal Laws of Criminal Trials 
A reading of the post-Brecht cases reveals that harmless-error analysis 
is dependent on a series of assumptions about causal laws involving the im-
pact of evidentiary and other factors on jury decisionmaking. But a look at 
research on jury decisionmaking reveals that these assumptions are re-
markably ungrounded in empiricism. In this section, I provide a brief over-
view of the research on how jurors process information and reach 
decisions, 138 and conclude that the dominant view in the harmless-error 
cases of how jurors use pieces of evidence to reach a decision on guilt or 
innocence contradicts the findings of the empirical literature. This differ-
ence, I argue, calls into serious question the accuracy of harmless-error 
analysis. I then consider a few specific examples of empirical assumptions 
in the post-Brecht cases. 
Determining factual causation, and therefore harm, requires a theory of 
how jurors make decisions, and, more specifically, how jurors use various 
pieces of evidence to reach a judgment on the defendant's guilt. 139 But as 
138 A full evaluation of the different models that are used to explain juror decisionmaking is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
139 In this paper, I focus exclusively on the initial vote that jurors bring into to the deliberation 
room. Because research shows that the distribution of the individual jurors' first-ballot votes predicts 
the result in 90% of cases, this is a useful and legitimate focus of analysis for determining causation (and 
therefore harm) at criminal trials. See Dennis J. Devine eta!., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Em-
pirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'Y & L. 622, 690 (2001) ("There are 
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Dow and Rytting have pointed out, "harmless error doctrine is not per-
spicuous even with respect to the process by which the hypothetical reason-
able juror couples evidentiary propositions with a causal law in order to 
generate a verdict."140 
Indeed, all available evidence indicates that judges are not very good at 
determining the impact of various pieces of evidence on jurors.141 There has 
been little empirical research on this topic, and one of the aims of this Arti-
cle is to lay the groundwork for more such research. In one of the few stud-
ies on this subject, researchers at the University ofNew Mexico found that 
lawyers (a proxy for judges) and laypersons (a proxy for jurors) varied 
widely in their assessments of the probative value of various pieces of evi-
dence.142 
Moreover, various lessons from cognitive psychology and behavioral 
decision theory point in pessimism's direction. First, hindsight bias is 
likely to be influential here-that is, the fact that a judge knows, consider-
ing the case retrospectively, that the defendant has been found guilty intro-
duces a natural bias that this outcome was inevitable, regardless of the 
error. 143 The hindsight bias problem also relates to a base rate problem. 
Every criminal defendant that appellate judges see is guilty, a convicted 
criminal before the law. 144 In the experience of appellate judges, then, 
1 00% of defendants that stand trial are convicted. But murder trials, which 
comprise the overwhelming majority of habeas cases, result in significantly 
compelling data from numerous studies indicating that the verdict favored by the majority of the jury at 
the beginning of deliberation will be the jury's final verdict about 90% of the time."). 140 Dow & Rytting, supra note 30, at 510. Richard Wright describes "causal generalizations" as 
"incompletely specified causal laws that list only some, not all, of the abstract antecedent conditions that 
would be found in the fully specified causal laws." Richard W. Wright, The Efficiency Theory of Causa-
tion and Responsibility: Unscientific Formalism and False Semantics, 63 CHJ.-KENT. L. REv. 553, 559 
(I 987). Because we live "in the real world of imperfect knowledge," we must use causal generalizations 
to try to judge singular instances of causation. ld. 141 Goldberg, supra note 29, at 430 (noting that one of the problems with appellate fact-finding is 
that "the appellate court is likely to be wrong"). 142 See Lee E. Teitelbaum et al., Evaluating the Prejudicial Effect of Evidence: Can Judges Identify 
the Impact of Improper Evidence on Juries?, 1983 WIS. L. REv. 1147, 1183 (concluding that "[t]he high 
incidence of significant differences between lawyers' and laypersons' evaluations of prejudice leaves it 
even more doubtful that appellate judges can tell when an item of proof was sufficiently weighty to 
move the jury from nonpersuasion to belief beyond a reasonable doubt"). 143 See Michael J. Saks & Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial 
by Heuristics, 15 L. & Soc'Y REv. 123, 144-45 (1981) (describing the hindsight bias). 144 See Cooper, supra note 26, at 343 (noting that "the fact of the jury's guilty verdict is likely to af-
fect the appellate judge's perception of the weight of the evidence against the defendant"); Kate Stith, 
The Risk of Legal Error in Criminal Cases: Some Consequences of the Asymmetry in the Right to Ap-
peal, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. I, 48 (1990) (noting the possibility of appellate prejudice against defendants 
who "have been 'found' to be criminals"); see also Saks & Kidd, supra note 143, at 150-51 (noting that 
the research on heuristics suggests that errors "are massively in the direction of being seduced by case-
specific information and failing to employ base-rate information"). 
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more acquittals than most trials. 145 Of course, another common cognitive 
bias-the attribution error--could cut the other way. Judges might see the 
error, and the resulting conviction, and be naturally inclined to see a causal 
connection where such a connection may be weak. 146 
Existing models in the evidence scholarship and literature on juror de-
cisionmaking fall into roughly two categories: a probabilistic or algebraic 
model, versus the "story model." Under the algebraic or probabilistic 
model, various pieces of evidence are presented at trial. After each piece of 
evidence is presented, jurors assign it a certain weight based on the credibil-
ity of the evidence and its probative value bearing on guilt. 147 Under this 
model, based on Bayes' theorem of probability, each juror starts with an 
initial assessment of the probability that the defendant is guilty, then has an 
updated assessment after receiving additional evidence. 148 At the end of the 
trial, each piece of evidence can be added up, as in an algebraic equation, 
based on the juror's assessment of probative direction (guilt or innocence) 
and force, and if the probabilistic assessment of guilt exceeds the juror's 
understanding of guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt," (let us say 90%, for 
example), then the juror will vote for a guilty verdict. 
A visual representation of this model-and a metaphor commonly seen 
in judicial opinions and scholarship-might be that of a scale where evi-
dence supporting guilt is on one end, and evidence supporting innocence is 
on the other. Such a visual representation is, of course, behind the verbal 
formulation of "weighing the evidence," the dominant paradigm in the 
145 In 1996, 5% of murder defendants in the seventy-five largest counties were tried and acquitted, 
compared with only 1% of defendants for all serious felonies. William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and 
Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2563 n.37 (2004) (citing BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-2000, at 
463 tbl.5.53 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 2001)). Stuntz argues that the relatively high 
acquittal rate is because prosecutors generally pursue every murder case they can, in part because of the 
public pressure to punish a homicide. /d. 
146 Other aspects of retrospective evaluation of the effect of various pieces of evidence on jurors are 
problematic, particularly the difference between the "cold record" and seeing the witnesses in person. 
Although social science research indicates that people tend to do a poor job of assessing witness credi-
bility, they do use nonverbal cues to assess credibility and the probative value of the evidence. See, e.g., 
Lance Stockwell & David C. Schrader, Factors that Persuade Jurors, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 109-10 
(1995) (indicating that "nonverbal immediacy" was the most important factor distinguishing between 
winning and losing lawyers and witnesses). But these nonverbal cues are inaccessible to judges, who 
are therefore likely to guess incorrectly as to how much force jurors assigned a particular witness's tes-
timony. 
147 For an early exposition of this view, see John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding 
Process, 20 STAN L. REv. 1065 (1968), and for a rejection of it, see Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathe-
matics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1350-54 (1971). 
148 See Thomas Bayes, An Essay Towards Solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY OF LONDON (1763), available at 
http://www.stat.ucla.edu/history/essay.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2005); Daniel J. Komstein, A Bayesian 
Model of Harmless Error, 5 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 125-27 (1976) (describing the Bayesian model of de-
termining guilt). 
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harmless-error analyses. 149 
This Bayesian model is perhaps most clearly reflected in the majority 
opinion in Cooper v. Taylor, the en bane Fourth Circuit death penalty case 
discussed in Section III.B. In that case the majority concluded that the im-
properly admitted confession was harmless because the evidence in the case 
was "totally one-sided."150 The majority then made the following baseball 
analogy: 
By analogy, the jury witnessed the government score 14 runs with its evidence 
and the defense score none. If, for the sake of argument, we were required to 
invalidate what we would expect Cooper to characterize as a government 
grand-slam home run, the remaining 10-0 score would still have left the jury's 
verdict the same. . . . [T]he dissent would somehow urge if the grand slam 
home run were disqualified and the resulting score were reduced 10-0, the 
guilty verdict is per se adversely affected. That, however, is not the law. 151 
Under this model, each piece of inculpatory evidence is added to the 
"score" on the prosecution's side, much like the variables intended to repre-
sent pieces of evidence in the Bayesian algebraic model. If the margin is 
sufficiently large (call it a prosecutorial blowout), then the jury should find 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
But the dissenting judges took issue with this model, arguing that the 
majority's method of tallying up the score, besides trivializing the inquiry, 
ignored the "central role the taped confession played in the trial."152 In 
other words, the dissenting judges took issue with the very nature of how 
the majority thought about the impact of evidence on the verdict. 
Indeed, the current consensus in social science research is that this 
Bayesian model does a poor job of describing how jurors actually make de-
cisions.153 Rather, the "story" model does a better job of describing jurors' 
information processing, and how evidence affects the jurors' ultimate deci-
sion. First conceptualized by Bennett and Feldman, this model describes 
what jurors do during trials as "story construction."154 That is, jurors hear 
149 See supra Part II; see also, e.g., Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 847 (6th Cir. 1999) ("In light of 
the great weight of evidence against the defendant, we do not believe the introduction of these limited 
statements ... had any significant influence on the jury's decision making process."). 
150 103 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 1996). 
151 Jd. at 370-71. 
152 /d. at 374 (Hamilton, J., dissenting). 
153 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 604, 
604 (1994) (explaining that the conventional Bayesian approach has been undermined by developments 
in cognitive psychology and research into jury decisionmaking which "made it rather plain that virtually 
no one thinks as the conventional legal theory requires"); Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury 
Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REv. 1857, 1861 (2001) (observing that Bayesian 
and averaging models have enjoyed "limited success as descriptions of how jurors actually decide 
cases," but that the story model comports better with empirical evidence). 
154 W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: 
JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE II 7 ( 1981) (pointing out that facts or evidence occupy 
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witnesses, receive physical evidence, and as they are listening, attempt to fit 
the evidence into a narrative that explains the events described. Seen this 
way, the adversarial trial is a battle of competing narratives, and the jurors' 
task is to assess the "relative plausibility" of each side's narrative. 
Two cognitive psychologists, Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie, have 
actually tested this theory and found it has significant explanatory power. 155 
And the resulting shift among cognitive and experimental psychologists has 
influenced the direction of evidence theorists as well. Ronald Allen, a lead-
ing evidence scholar, has led the charge of "Bayesioskeptics," using Pen-
nington and Hastie's work to develop a theory of "relative plausibility," or 
competing narratives, as a more realistic representation of jurors' cognitive 
processing. 156 On the Supreme Court, Justice Souter has indicated interest 
in the competing narratives model, and how it bears on the impact of evi-
dence on thejury. 157 
Some courts conducting harmless-error analysis do explicitly consider 
the impact of the error on the "relative plausibility" of the defendant's nar-
rative as compared to the prosecution's version of events. 158 But by and 
large, harmless-error doctrine and scholarship has not caught up to this 
an inherently ambiguous position in trials, and that "[w]hat makes a fact or piece of evidence meaning-
ful in a particular case is its contextual role in the stories that make up the case"). 
155 Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evidence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror 
Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 189, 202 (1992) (concluding that research sup-
ports the claim that "stories are the mediating mental structures that cause decisions in the juror's judg-
ment task"); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitiv:! Theory of Juror Decision Making: The 
Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L. REv. 519, 536 (1991) (citing research showing that "story structures dif-
fered systematically for jurors choosing different verdicts") [hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, A Cogni-
tive Theory]. 
156 See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Brian Leiter, Naturalized Epistemology and the Law of Evidence, 87 
VA. L. REv. 1491, 1527-28 (2001) ("The critical insight of the relative plausibility theory is that legal 
fact finding involves a determination of the comparative plausibility of the parties' explanations offered 
at trial rather than a determination of whether discrete elements are found to a specific probability."). 
157 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 307 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that undis-
closed impeachment evidence could have led to a sentence other than death because of the "undeniable 
narrative force" of the witness's testimony (citing E. LOFTUS & 1. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: 
CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 5 (1997) ("Research redoundingly proves that the story format is a powerful key 
to juror decision making"))); Old Chiefv. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 187-89 (1997). 
158 See Caldwell v. Bell, 288 F.3d 838, 844 (6th Cir. 2002) ("We believe the instruction did particu-
lar damage by undermining Caldwell's alternative theory of the killing based on the claim of 'provoca-
tion."'); Thomas v. Hubbard, 273 F.3d 1164, 1181 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that errors were harmful 
because they bore in part on defense's ability to "attack the prosecution's theory of the case" and limited 
defendant's opportunity to present evidence "in support of his principal defense"); Mach v. Stewart, 137 
F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that error bore on critical issue in sexual misconduct case of 
"whether the jury chose to believe the child or the defendant"); Taylor v. Singletary, 122 F.3d 1390, 
1396 (lith Cir. 1997) (defendant's inability to introduce codefendant's testimony "essentially precluded 
him from putting on a defense"); Lyons v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 499, 504 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding harm when 
defendant was prevented from putting another man who may have physically resembled the defendant, 
and who two defense eyewitnesses said was "the actual perpetrator," before the jury). 
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trend. The Bayesian model remains dominant in harmless-error cases. 159 In 
determining harm, judges in the post-Brecht cases essentially take away the 
variable representing the error, asking the question: if you subtract that 
variable, does the jurors' probabilistic assessment of guilt still exceed the 
reasonable doubt threshold? This Bayesian approach is not an unreasonable 
way of thinking about the causal effect of a particular piece of evidence, but 
it doesn't quite get at the way jurors reason. Rather, in determining harm-
lessness, judges ought to move beyond considering the evidence's probative 
force in a vacuum, and instead consider the extent to which the evidence 
bears on the relative plausibility of the prosecution and defense versions of 
events. 160 
In short, in light of social science research which indicates that the 
"story model" more accurately describes the way jurors process information 
and reach a verdict, harmless-error analyses overuse the probabilistic or al-
gebraic model, likely leading to mistakes in the harmless-error determina-
tion. 
B. General Causation: Drawing Inferences from Empirical Research 
Besides decisionmaking models like those described above, judges 
necessarily rely on a set of causal generalizations to determine the impact of 
an error on the verdict. In the following section, I provide a few specific 
examples of causal generalizations from the post-Brecht cases whose em-
159 In Arizona v. Fulminante, Justice Rehnquist's opinion describes "trial error" subject to harmless-
error analysis as evidence that can be "quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented 
in order to determine whether its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 499 U.S. 279, 
308 (1991). The use of the term "quantitatively assessed" seems to imply a weighing or algebraic 
model, as opposed to the "relative plausibility" model of a trial. See also Stith, supra note 144, at 44 
n.ll2 (noting that consideration of the strength of the remaining evidence of guilt is consistent with a 
Bayesian approach to harmless error). 
160 See Gray v. Klauser, 282 F.3d 633, 651 (9th Cir. 2002) (reasoning that excluded evidence was 
harmful because it "would have provided the jury with a possible answer to the critical question that 
arises whenever the defendant's defense is that he did not commit the crime: Then who did?"); Agnew 
v. Leibach, 250 F.3d 1123, 1133 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that error was not harmless based in large 
part on the fact that improper testimony related to the central issue in the case: "whether a robbery oc-
curred or whether [defendant] was simply defending himself in a fight"); Maurino v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 
638, 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (Holschuh, J., dissenting) (arguing that prosecutorial misconduct designed to 
undermine defendant's credibility went right to central issue in the case-intent-and "the defendant's 
own testimony regarding his intent was the foundation of his defense"); Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F.3d 
1155, 1170 (8th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (arguing that error was not harmless be-
cause it was relevant to "perhaps the most crucial issue at trial"-whether the victim was murdered 
(prosecution's version) or committed suicide (defendant's version)); Scoggin v. Kaiser, 186 F.3d 1203, 
1208 (lOth Cir. 1999) (finding improper jury instruction on theft of merchandise harmless because 
"[p]etitioner's defense turned not on the nature of the property taken" but on his claim of misidentifica-
tion); Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 177 (3d Cir. 1999) ("In this case, the nature of the prosecution's 
evidence and Buehl's defense rendered the error in this instruction harmless."); Harris v. Warden, 152 
F.3d 430, 439 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that an improper jury instruction on intent was harmless where 
intent was not in dispute). 
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pirical grounding appears to be in question. 
1. The Impact of "Cumulative" Evidence.-One reason commonly 
given by judges for a detennination of harmlessness is that the improperly 
admitted evidence was "cumulative" in light of other, properly admitted 
evidence-or, alternatively, that the improperly excluded evidence would 
have been cumulative.161 On its face, the proposition seems straightforward 
and uncontroversial enough. Ostensibly, because the jury has already re-
ceived evidence tending to prove what this evidence demonstrates, the error 
could not have had a "substantial and injurious effect" on the verdict. Upon 
closer look, however, this logical tum is less straightforward than it might 
appear. There is an empirical assumption embedded in this logic-that evi-
dence that is "cumulative" necessarily has a negligible causal impact on the 
jury's assessment of guilt. That is, that if two witnesses have already testi-
fied that they saw Jim Jones shoot a gun on the night of June 16, then the 
third witness's testimony to the same effect is of little value to the jury. 
But social science research indicates that this assumption may not be 
valid. For example, research on cascaded inferences by Schum and Martin 
indicates that "corroboratively or cumulatively redundant testimony" tends 
to be overvalued or "double counted."162 Schum and Martin's subjects were 
asked to read transcripts in invented felony cases, and assess how strongly 
each piece of evidence supported the guilt or innocence of the defendant. 
The authors had the subjects assess the evidence in three different ways. 
When presented with evidence that was redundant in some sense, the sub-
jects in Schum and Martin's experiments, using two out of those three 
methods, were consistent in assigning the same probative weight to the sec-
ond (and corroborative or cumulative) item of testimony, as they did to the 
first. 
In other words, though the evidence was "cumulative," it still had a 
161 See Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 921 (7th Cir. 2000) (reasoning that the prosecution's failure 
to inform the jury of terms of cooperating witness's plea agreement was harmless because witness "was 
cross-examined for approximately a week, and the jury heard extensive evidence demonstrating his lack 
of credibility"); Evans v. Lock, 193 F.3d 1000, 1003--04 (8th Cir. 1999) (reasoning that improper identi-
fication testimony was "cumulative" of proper identification testimony by another witness); Bryson v. 
Ward, 187 F.3d 1193, 1206 (lOth Cir. 1999) (finding harmlessness based in part on fact that excluded 
videotape "did not tend to establish any facts ... that had not already been presented to the jury"); Pyles 
v. Johnson, 136 F.3d 986, 996 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning that juror's daytime visit to the crime scene 
was harmless because it was "largely duplicative" of evidence presented at trial); Craig v. Singletary, 
127 F .3d I 030, 1040 (lith Cir. 1997) (reasoning that admission of confession was harmless because a 
properly admitted confession "overlapped the first" and was even more damaging to the defendant). But 
see Stapleton v. Wolfe, 288 F.3d 863, 868 (6th Cir. 2002) (ruling that admission of accomplice state-
ment was harmful because the multiple accomplice statements "reinforced and corroborated each other" 
(quoting Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 299)). 
162 See David A. Schum & Anne W. Martin, Formal and Empirical Research on Cascaded Infer-
ence in Jurisprudence, in INSIDE THE JUROR 136, 165 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993). The concern that jurors 
"double count" redundant testimony is drawn from Richard 0. Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 MICH. 
L. REv. 1021, 1057 (1977). 
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causal impact that was significant, or at least no less significant than if the 
evidence was the first of its kind. Two eyewitnesses with motives to lie and 
shifty demeanors means that the third eyewitness, disinterested and confi-
dent on the stand, might well have a "substantial and injurious effect" on 
the minds of the jurors even if the content of his testimony is exactly the 
same as that of the first two witnesses. 163 No doubt, there will be circum-
stances where the "cumulative" nature of the evidence will diminish its im-
pact on the jury, but it is by no means a truism, as it appears to be treated in 
many judicial opinions. 
2. The Framing of Choices.-Another example of a causal generali-
zation with dubious empirical grounding is the effect of improper (but not 
chosen) options that were presented to the jury, and is illustrated in the 
Tenth Circuit death penalty case, Hale v. Gibson. 164 In Hale, the defendant 
was charged with murder and kidnapping. The prosecution told the jury 
that both counts carried the death penalty, and urged its imposition on both 
counts, but the kidnapping charge actually did not carry a possible death 
sentence. The jury returned a life sentence on the kidnapping count and a 
death sentence on the murder count. The reviewing court reasoned that the 
erroneous instruction on the kidnapping count was harmless because the 
jury "was given a full range of possible sentences and chose a permissible 
sentence under Oklahoma law-life in prison. " 165 Furthermore, the court 
argued that there was no evidence that "the jury was influenced to give a 
life sentence simply because they were given the impermissible choice of 
giving a death sentence."166 
The court was correct in a narrow sense. There was no evidence of di-
rect or specific causation here-that is, evidence that the choice of a death 
sentence on the kidnapping charge influenced this jury to choose a life sen-
tence. But as to general causation, there is plenty of evidence-ignored by 
this court-that cuts the other way. Social science research has shown that 
the same option is frequently evaluated more favorably when it is presented 
as intermediate in a set of options under consideration, compared to when it 
is at an extreme. 167 
163 The Schum and Martin experiment assumed the same level of credibility for each witness; in an 
actual trial, of course, jurors will credit the testimony of a particular witness to a greater or lesser extent 
depending on a variety of factors, with the extent impossible to discern from an appellate judge's read-
ing of the transcript. See also Devine et al., supra note 139, at 685 (describing study that found that the 
number of trial witnesses was positively related to the likelihood of conviction); Lempert, supra note 
162, at I 054 (pointing out that the testimony of four eyewitnesses to a crime, though it could be termed 
cumulative, may have "substantial probative value since the probability of the same mistake being made 
by four witnesses with such different reasons to err appears small"). 
164 227 F.3d 1298 (lOth Cir. 2000). 
165 ld. at 1325. 
166 ld. 
167 See Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, in BEHAVIORAL LAW 
& ECONOMICS 61 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000). This phenomenon is referred to as a "compromise ef-
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Hale v. Gibson is a perfect example of that phenomenon. A jury faced 
with a choice of 20 years in prison, life in prison, and death on the kidnap-
ping charge may have been influenced to choose a life sentence in part be-
cause it was an intermediate option. If the choices were 10 years in prison, 
20 years in prison, and life in prison, which would have been more consis-
tent with the law, the jury might well have made a different choice simply 
because of the framing of the options. 168 This appears to be another case 
where the causal generalization that is determining harm lacks a strong em-
pirical foundation. 
3. Limiting or Ameliorating Instructions.-When an error occurs at 
trial, the judge, or the lawyers, often recognize the error when it happens. 
In such a case, or in the case where evidence is admitted but only for a spe-
cific purpose, judges frequently give the jury limiting or ameliorating in-
structions, telling them to disregard the error. 
When the resulting conviction is challenged, reviewing judges fre-
quently point to such instructions in concluding that the error did not have a 
substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. 169 The empirical assumption 
of causal relations here is straightforward: any prejudicial impact of the 
evidence is minimized by the judge's instructions. Such an assumption is 
consistent with-indeed a subset of-the broader maxim that jurors are pre-
sumed to follow the judge's instructions. The only problem is this: the 
bulk of research on this topic indicates that these sorts of instructions do not 
work and often backfrre. 170 In other words, limiting or ameliorating instruc-
feet." See also Saks & Kidd, supra note 143, at 140-42 (describing the related phenomena of"anchor-
ing"). As a practical matter, this would not have made a difference in this case (which may ultimately 
account for the outcome of this issue) because the jury imposed the death sentence on the murder con-
viction. 
168 Cf Devine et al., supra note 139, at 670 (summarizing studies suggest that "allowing juries the 
opportunity to convict the defendant on a lesser charge has a substantial impact on their verdicts"). 
169 See Payton v. Woodford, 258 F.3d 915, 918 (9th Cir. 2001) (concluding that no harm was done, 
based in part on the assumption that the prosecutor's incorrect statement of the law "was ameliorated by 
the court's admonishment"); McGhee v. Yukins, 229 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 2000) ("The trial court in-
structed the jurors to consider each defendant's confession only against that defendant, and the jury is 
presumed to have followed that instruction."); Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(ruling that judge's admonition to disregard extraneous evidence of prior plea "adequately told" jurors to 
decide the case on the evidence); Nethery v. Collins, 993 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1993) ("Nor are we 
prepared to say that this assumed error was not corrected by the court's curative instruction."); see also 
Devine et al., supra note 139, at 686 ("Courts have thus implicitly accepted the notion that jurors can 
and do heed the direction of the judge, but social scientists have been more skeptical and have sought to 
determine empirically if jurors do in fact disregard inadmissible evidence."). But see Maurine v. John-
son, 210 F.3d 638, 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (Holschuh, J., dissenting) (concluding that "the standard caution-
ary instruction was inadequate to 'unring the bell'"); Hill v. Turpin, 135 F.3d 1411, 1419 (lith Cir. 
1998) ("Nor can we say that the trial court's valiant and well-intentioned attempt to remedy the ... error 
through curative instructions eliminated the taint created by the prosecutor."). 
170 See Devine et al., supra note 139, at 666 ("In general, limiting instructions have proven to be in-
effective and have even been associated with a paradoxical increase in the targeted behavior."); Phoebe 
C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived Problems and Pro-
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tions by the judge frequently increase, rather than decrease, the weight that 
jurors give to the evidence. Contrary to notions of causal effect that appear 
in judicial harmless-error analyses, the presence of such instructions ought 
to weigh on the side of harmfulness, not harmlessness. 
What are we to take from these examples? One conclusion might be to 
avoid making any such assumptions at all. But this seems difficult, if not 
impossible, in determining causal impact. Relying on such causal generali-
zations is necessary and appropriate-in tort-law terms, this is the "general 
causation" inquiry-but the generalizations themselves must be more em-
pirically grounded than is currently the case. 
In fact, there is a clear analog in tort law in toxic tort cases, where evi-
dence of causation in specific instances is difficult to demonstrate. 171 Con-
sider cases where workers allege that exposure to asbestos caused them to 
develop cancer. There simply is no medical test that can demonstrate the 
causal link with any degree of certainty, so courts have allowed epidemiol-
ogical evidence-that is, studies of the effect of certain chemicals on popu-
lations, as opposed to direct medical evidence that the specific plaintiff was 
harmed by the chemical-to allow for an inference of specific causation. 172 
In such cases, evidence of general causation can help make up for lack of 
proof of specific causation, which simply cannot be expected given the cir-
cumstances.173 
posed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL. & L. 788, 796 (2000) (same); Saul M. Kassin & Holly Sukel, 
Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless Error" Rule, 21 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 27,43 (1997) (finding in study that mock jury participants appeared to rely on confession 
even when the judge ruled it inadmissible and admonished the jury to disregard it and citing other stud-
ies with similar findings); WilliamS. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 WASH. L. REV. 329, 364-65 
(1995) (summarizing empirical evidence on jurors' lack of understanding of instructions); see also 
Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1581 (9th Cir. 1996) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (arguing that instruct-
ing a jury to ignore prior acts information in judging the offense at trial "is to ask human beings to act 
with a measure of dispassion and exactitude well beyond mortal capacities" (citations omitted)); cf 
Yohn v. Love, 76 F.3d 508, 524 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Because of all the controversy over the tape throughout 
the trial, the jury must have believed it was an important piece of evidence."). 171 See Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 
FORDHAM L. REv. 732 (1984); Mark Geistfeld, Scientific Uncertainty and Causation in Tort Law, 54 
VAND. L. REv. 1011, 1013-14 (2001) (noting that because many potentially hazardous substances have 
not been epidemiologically studied, "evidentiary gaps" exist with tort law that raise questions about spe-
cial evidentiary rules for establishing causation). 
172 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 96, § 28 cmt. a ("Courts generally permit juries to infer 
specific causation from a group study when the study finds that exposure to the agent causes at least a 
doubling in the incidence of disease in a group exposed to the agent compared to a group that was not 
exposed."); see also id. § 28 reporters' note cmt. c ("Applying the results of group studies to assess the 
probability of causation in an individual has become accepted."). I have previously discussed the anal-
ogy of epidemiological evidence in tort cases to prove causation in the context of workplace injuries. 
See Jason M. Solomon, Note, Fulfilling the Bargain: How the Science of Ergonomic.; Can Inform the 
Laws of Workers' Compensation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1140, 1171-72 (2001). 173 See, e.g., David W. Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1765, 
1774-75 (I 997) ("The central idea is that when a defendant has engaged in conduct that we consider to 
be wrongful in major part because such conduct often leads to the kind of harm the plaintiff has suf-
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Similarly, in retrospectively determining the effect of error on jurors, a 
variety of factors, including the time lag since the trial and the impermissi-
bility of direct inquiry into the jurors' states of mind, makes direct evidence 
of causal impact rare. As a result, drawing inferences from studies on the 
impact of different kinds of evidence on jurors is appropriate, and prefer-
able to mere speculation which, as the examples above demonstrate, is 
likely to result in inaccurate determinations of harm. 
C. Specific Causation: Looking to Evidence of Influence 
Harmless-error analysis has a methodological ideal to match the nor-
mative ideal of accurate determinations of factual causation. Methodologi-
cally, if judges could go back in time and read the minds of the jurors to 
determine the effect of the error upon the jurors' assessment of guilt, that 
would be the way to determine whether the error was harmless. If the error 
was "substantial" (non-negligible) and "injurious" (in the direction of guilt), 
then the error caused constitutional harm. But until time travel or neurosci-
ence improves, we are stuck with trial transcripts and causal generaliza-
tions. In the face of this dilemma, and in the absence of much guidance 
from scholars or the Supreme Court, many judges have quite understanda-
bly taken to looking solely at the untainted evidence of guilt. Although this 
is an important part of determining factual causation, as I argued earlier, 
other evidence-evidence of influence-is underutilized by judges and is 
an even better indicator of causation in this context. 
"Evidence of influence" is composed of several different factors that 
provide indirect or circumstantial evidence of: (1) the closeness of the case; 
(2) the centrality of the error to the jury's consideration of the case; and (3) 
the impact (substantial or not) of the error on the minds of the jury. These 
factors are occasionally but infrequently considered by judges in doing 
harmless-error analysis, as my empirical analysis of the post-Brecht cases 
revealed. 
First, judges ought to look at the length of jury deliberations. This is 
frequently knowable simply from looking at the trial transcripts. Moreover, 
the prosecutor in the case can be asked to submit an affidavit when the 
claim is adjudicated in federal district court on how long the deliberations 
lasted. Increased attention to this factor will no doubt induce state trial 
judges and lawyers to ensure that the length of deliberations is reflected in 
the record. The length of deliberations is likely to be a much better indica-
tor of the closeness of the case, than appellate judges' weighing of the evi-
dence based on the trial transcript and the parties' briefs. If the 
deliberations lasted one day versus one week, that ought to be a relevant 
factor in determining whether the error caused the conviction. But in the 
post-Brecht cases, the length of jury deliberations was only mentioned in 
fered, we are rightfully impatient with the defendant's claim that plaintiff cannot prove that the conduct 
caused the harm on this occasion."). 
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thirteen percent of cases. 174 This kind of analysis could also apply to refer-
encing what happened in a previous trial, if the evidence presented was 
similar, for evidence of the closeness of the case. 175 
Second, judges ought to look at what the jury asked for during jury de-
liberations to see on what issues and evidence the jury was focused. 176 For 
example, if the jury asked for readbacks of testimony at issue in harmless-
error analysis, that should presumptively be strong evidence of causation.177 
On the other hand, if they asked to see three critical pieces of testimony, 
and the erroneous piece was not one of them, that should weigh on the side 
174 But see Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 365 (1966) (emphasizing the fact that the jury deliber-
ated for twenty-six hours in finding prejudice); French v. Jones, 282 F.3d 893, 902 (6th Cir. 2002) (find-
ing that improper supplemental jury instruction caused harm when during three days of deliberations, 
jury sent out three "increasingly emphatic notes" saying that they were deadlocked); Karis v. Calderon, 
283 F .3d 1117, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that "even with the weak mitigation evidence that was pre-
sented, the jury was out for three days before rendering its verdict" in finding prejudice from ineffective 
assistance); Murtishaw v. Woodford, 255 F.3d 926, 968, 973 (9th Cir. 2001) (determining harm from 
erroneous jury instruction by relying in part on fact that jury took over two days to deliberate, twice 
asked for the definition of first-degree murder, asked to review testimony on defendant's alleged intoxi-
cation, and asked for readback of critical witness's testimony); Sassounian v. Roe, 230 F.3d 1097, 1110 
(9th Cir. 2000) ("Lengthy deliberations preceding the misconduct and a relatively quick verdict follow-
ing the misconduct strongly suggest prejudice." (citation omitted)); Tuggle v. Netherland, 79 F.3d 1386, 
1393 (4th Cir. 1996) (including "any indications that the jury was hesitant or entertained doubt in reach-
ing its sentencing determination" as a factor in determining harm during capital sentencing proceeding). 
175 See Newman v. Hopkins, 192 F. 3d 1132, 1137 (8th Cir. 1999) ("It is of more than passing sig-
nificance that [defendant's] first trial ended in a mistrial because the jury could not reach a unanimous 
verdict."); Bonner v. Holt, 26 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 (lith Cir. 1994) (determining key evidence of influ-
ence in finding harm was that there were two sets of jury deliberations in which "the only difference in 
the evidence before the jury was the evidence admitted in error''); Kyles v. Whitley, 5 F.3d 806, 832-34 
(5th Cir. 1993) (King, J., dissenting) (arguing that confidence in guilty verdict was undermined in part 
because defendant's first jury, hearing "essentially identical" evidence to that offered at the second trial, 
deadlocked on the question of guilt and stating "the fact that one or more jurors at [defendant's] first 
trial were not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt is significant in assessing the force of 
[defendant's] case or, alternatively, the weaknesses in the State's case"). But see Kooce v. Pepe, 99 
F.3d 469,476 (1st Cir. 1996) ("[Defendant] cites no authority for his premise that the mistrial in his first 
trial should shade [the court's] reasoning in this case."). 
176 See, e.g., Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 530 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding of harm from improper 
"showup identification" based in part on the fact that one of jury's "few requests during deliberations" 
was for a rereading of this testimony); Thompson v. Borg, 74 F.3d 1571, 1584 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (noting that the jury "deliberated for three days and continuously grappled 
with the self-defense issues-issues central to Thompson's primary defense theory-sending numerous 
questions and requests for assistance to the trial court"); Lawson v. Borg, 60 F.3d 608, 612 (9th Cir. 
1995) (noting that the jury's questions to the court indicated that "use of force was the subject of exten-
sive deliberations"); Castro v. Oklahoma, 71 F.3d 1502, 1516 (lOth Cir. 1995) (finding, in a review of a 
denial of funds for expert psychiatrist during capital sentencing proceeding, that the jury question of 
"Exactly what is meant by a life sentence?" indicated that it was "not self-evident" to the jury whether 
death penalty was warranted). 
177 The length of the testimony could also be used in certain circumstances to draw inferences about 
its impact. See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Collins, 994 F.2d 189, 199 (5th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the fact 
that witness's testimony "was about four times that of the states' other five witnesses combined" neces-
sarily suggests that testimony would have "substantial impact" on the jury). 
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of harmlessness. 
Third, the opening and summations ought to play a critical role. Ac-
cording to the "story model," the competing narratives-presented most 
coherently in the opening and closing statements-are influential in deter-
mining the jury's verdict. Though the research is mixed on how much sway 
opening. and closing statements have over the jury in and of themselves, 
they are likely to frame the way the jury thinks about the case. 178 Viewing 
the trial as one of competing narratives, the opening statements and summa-
tion would play a critical role in determining the role that the error played in 
each side's story.179 Whether the evidence or issue that is constitutional er-
ror is highlighted in the openings and closings ought to be a key factor in 
determining whether the error caused harm. 
Attention to the placement of the evidence within the trial could also 
be used as evidence of influence, something rarely done in current harm-
less-error analysis.180 Social science research indicates that evidence pre-
sented at the beginning and end of the trial is likely to be more influential 
than evidence presented in the middle of the trial. 181 And the research on 
coherence-based reasoning gives further support to the importance of evi-
dence at the beginning of trial. 182 Finally, in appropriate circumstances, the 
178 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Criminology: Juror Reactions to Attorneys at Trial, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 17, 28 (1996) (describing the mixed evidence on opening statements). 
179 See, e.g., Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1140 (9th Cir. 2002)(relying in part on the fact that 
the prosecutor "repeatedly stressed the absence of any testimony of mitigation throughout the penalty 
phase argument" in finding of prejudice from ineffective assistance of counsel); Ghent v. Woodford, 279 
F.3d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding of harm based in part on prosecution's heavy reliance on wit-
ness' testimony during both opening and closing arguments); Moon v. Head, 285 F.3d 1301, 1317 (lith 
Cir. 2002) (ruling in a case where Brecht standard was clearly outcome-determinative that admission of 
a conviction subsequently vacated was harmless because the prosecution "confined its comments" re-
garding the vacated convictions to approximately five pages in the forty-six page transcript of the clos-
ing argument at capital sentencing); Wray v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 515, 529 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that in 
summation, prosecutor "launched directly and repeatedly" into improper identification of defendant at 
precinct); Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1032 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding harmlessness in part because 
"[t]he complained of references" constitute "less than a tenth" of prosecutor's sentencing argument). 
180 But see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 302 (1999) (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part) (arguing the credibility of witness's testimony was particularly important because witness 
was the first to describe defendant in any detail, "thus providing the frame for the remainder of the story 
the prosecution presented to the jury"); Ghent, 279 F.3d at 1131 (inferring the importance of psychia-
trist' s testimony from the fact that "the State reordered its proof in the special circumstances retrial so as 
to make [the psychiatrist] its second witness in its case-in-chief (instead of using him only as a rebuttal 
witness, as it did at the first trial)"). 
181 See Pennington & Hastie, A Cognitive Theory, supra note 155, at 542 (presenting study demon-
strating that presentation order of evidence affects verdict decisions dramatically); Michael J. Saks, 
What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should) Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. I, 25 ( 1997) ("If nothing else is clear from the order effects research, it is that information presented 
in the middle has less impact than information presented at the beginning or the end."). 
182 See, e.g., SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 134-37 (1988) (explaining that considerable research supports the idea 
that initial impressions of jurors persevere even when presented with contrary evidence); Laufer, supra 
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District Court can further develop the record on whether errors influenced 
the jury,183 although inquiries into the jury's deliberative process are prohib-
ited. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the empirical analysis in Part III revealed, harmless-error analysis is 
breaking down in the midst of doctrinal deadlock over the proper approach, 
preventing headway on the even more difficult task of arriving at an answer 
in determining harm. With the confusion in habeas and harmless-error ju-
risprudence after Brecht and the Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, the central inquiry-how to determine whether an error is 
harmless-has gotten lost in the shuffle. This Article has tried to shift the 
focus back to that important question. 
The question of factual causation is the shared normative ideal at the 
heart of both doctrinal approaches. To make this causal determination, I 
hope that courts will use a hybrid approach that uses the historical (and not 
counterfactual) reasoning of the "substantial factor" test, while retaining 
some evaluation of the strength of the prosecution's case-the centerpiece 
of the "but for" analysis-as one of several factors to weigh in assessing 
harm. Under such an approach, the judge would also consider three factors, 
broadly defined: (1) general causation, using empirical research on how 
various types of evidence impact jurors; (2) specific causation-that is, 
evidence of influence on the jury such as the length of deliberations, or re-
quests for the read back of testimony; and (3) consideration of the relevance 
of the error to the competing narratives presented to the jury, given the re-
search supporting the "story model" in explaining how jurors reach a ver-
dict. 
Further empirical research is needed, both on jury decisionmaking and 
on judges' abilities to assess the impact of various errors on jurors. Through 
such research, scholars and members of the bar can determine whether any 
mistakes in assessment by judges are systematic and can be corrected. But 
the Federal Judicial Center, bar associations, and others can and should take 
steps now to make the existing empirical research on juries more widely 
available to judges and their staffs, as well as to criminal appellate lawyers 
and pro se petitioners. 
Despite the overwhelming percentage of criminal cases that are now 
resolved by pleas, and the scholarly attention that has followed, these harm-
note 170, at 399--400 (same). 
183 See, e.g., Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 683 (4th Cir. 2002) (remanding case for determination 
of whether jury was improperly made aware of information regarding defendant's prior death sentence); 
Hegler v. Borg, 50 F.3d 1472, 1474-75 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that district court judge examined court 
reporter and four jurors to determine effect of defendant's absence during readback of testimony); 
Duckett v. Godinez, 67 F.3d 734, 749 (9th Cir. 1995) (remanding case for evidentiary hearing on 
whether defendant's shackles were visible to the jury and "how onerous" they were during trial). 
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less-error cases remain a critical slice of our criminal justice system. They 
are the cases where the defendant has decided to make the prosecution 
prove its case, perhaps because he is innocent, and where a judge has de-
termined that the truth-furthering constitutional protections have broken 
down. Here is one identifiable class of cases, then, where we risk wrong-
fully convicted men and women remaining imprisoned, while the actual 
perpetrators go free. In light of the stakes, it is worth our attention to see 
whether the law of wrongs can help solve the riddle of harmless error. 
1099 
